U. S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration

UMTA-VA-06-0088-83-1 Case Studies of Transit Security on Bus Systems U. S. Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration  John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center Cambridge MA 02142

August 1983 Final Report Reprint February 1995

 

 

 

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS

 

PREFACE

    This study examines the measures taken by the principal transit systems in each of four cities -- Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, and Pittsburgh. This study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Office of Technical Assistance and performed by MANDEX, Inc. under contract DTUM60-81-C-71098.

    Transit and law enforcement officials in Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle and Pittsburgh provided most of the data contained in this report as well as many valuable insights into transit crime and the measures taken to combat it. We wish to thank them for their cooperation and their numerous helpful suggestions. Many thanks also go to the citizens in the case study cities who took the time to talk with us about security on their buses. We especially wish to thank Ms. Gwendolyn Cooper of the Safety and Security Staff, Office of Technical Assistance, Urban Mass Transportation Administration , for her valuable supervision and comments on the draft reports.

    This project was begun under Mr. Robert Maxwell while he was a Vice President of MANDEX, Inc. We would like to thank him for his contribution to this project. When he left MANDEX, Dr. Eileen Hargadine became the principle investigator. The MANDEX officer in charge was Mr. David Couts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Background 
1.2 Historical Perspective of Transit Passenger Security 
1.3 Determining the Effectiveness of Security Measures 
1.4 Selection of Four Cities for Case Studies 

2. CITY CASE STUDIES 

   2.1 Detroit 

   2.1.1 Development of the Bluebirds and Alternatives Considered 
   2.1.2 Bluebird Operations 
   2.1.3 Additional Security Equipment and Related Programs 
   2.1.4 D-DOT and The City It Serves 

   2.2 Los Angeles 

   2.2.1 Development of the SCRTD Transit Police Force 
   2.2.2 SCRTD Transit Police Operations 
   2.2.3 SCRTD Coordination With Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
   2.2.4 Additional Security Measures 
   2.2.5 Los Angeles and the Southern California Rapid Transit District 

   2.3 Seattle 

       2.3.1 Seattle's Comprehensive Security Plans 
       2.3.2 Seattle's Undercover Police Operations 
       2.3.3 Development of the Stress Management Program 
       2.3.4 Other Measures to Improve Transit Security 
       2.3.5 Union Response to Measures to Improve Operator Security 
       2.3.6 Seattle and Its Transit System 

   2.4 Pittsburgh 

       2.4.1 Development of the PAT Police Force 
       2.4.2 PAT Police Operations 
       2.4.3 Other Security Measures and Equipment 
       2.4.4 Operator Response to Transit Security 
       2.4.5 The PAT System 

3. POLICING TRANSIT SYSTEMS 

   3.1 Transit Policing Organizations 
   3.2 Transit Policing Operations 
   3.3 Public Awareness
   3.4 Legislation and Prosecution 

4. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY MEASURES 

   4.1 Two-Way Radios and Alarm Systems 
   4.2 Automatic Vehicle Monitoring System 
   4.3 Cameras on Buses 

5. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 

   5.1 Transit Education Programs 

       5.1.1 Detroit 
       5.1.2 Seattle 
       5.1.3 Los Angeles 
       5.1.4 Pittsburgh

   5.2 Community Outreach Programs 
   5.3 Stress Management Training 

6. COSTS OF THE SECURITY MEASURES EXAMINED 

   6.1 Costs of Policing Operations 

       6.1.1 Detroit 
       6.1.2 Los Angeles
       6.1.3 Seattle 
       6.1.4 Pittsburgh
       6.1.5 Summary 

   6.2 Costs of Mechanical and Electronic Security Devices 
   6.3 Costs of Other Programs 

7. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TRANSIT CRIME 

   7.1 Public Perception of Transit Security and the Bluebird Operation 
   7.2 Public Perception of Personal Safety in Los Angeles 
   7.3 Public Perception of Transit Crime in Seattle
   7.4 Public Perception of Transit Security in Pittsburgh
   7.5 Summary 

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

   8.1 Policing Transit Systems 
   8.2 Equipment to Enhance Passenger Security
   8.3 Stress Management Programs
   8.4 Public Perception of Transit Security and the Impact of Service Quality 
   8.5 School Education Programs

APPENDIX A PERSONS CONTACTED 

APPENDIX B REPORT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 

REFERENCES 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  

 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

2-1  PART I TRANSIT OFFENSES, 1970-1980 

2-2  NUMBER OF REPORTED PART I CRIMES PER MILLION PASSENGERS 

2-3  PART II TRANSIT OFFENSES REPORTED BY D-DOT AND BLUEBIRDS, 1970-1980. 

2-4  INCIDENCE OF CRIME PER MILLION INHABITANTS IN DETROIT SMSA 

2-5  NUMBER OF CRIMES PER HUNDRED INHABITANTS IN LOS ANGELES AND THE SURROUNDING SMSA

2-6  NUMBER OF CRIMES PER MILLION INHABITANTS IN SEATTLE AND
THE SURROUNDING SMSA 

2-7  RECORD OF MONTHLY OPERATOR ASSAULTS 

5-1  RECORD OF MONTHLY OPERATOR ASSAULTS 

 

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1-1  CITIES CONSIDERED FOR CASE STUDIES 

1-2  SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS:
GROUP I SYSTEMS (OVER 100 MILLION PASSENGERS/YEAR) 

1-3  SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS:
GROUP II SYSTEMS (20 TO 100 MILLION PASSENGERS/YEAR) 

1-4  SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS:
GROUP III SYSTEMS (LESS THAN 20 MILLION PASSENGERS/YEAR) 

1-5  GROUP I SYSTEMS CANDIDATES FOR TRANSIT SECURITY STUDY
SITES 

1-6  GROUP II SYSTEMS CANDIDATES FOR TRANSIT SECURITY STUDY
SITES 

2-1  OPERATOR-REPORTED TRANSIT CRIME, 1970-1978 

2-2  SCRTD TRANSIT POLICE-REPORTED OFFENSES 

2-3  METRO TRANSIT ANNUAL OPERATING STATISTICS 

2-4  PASSENGERS CARRIED (1980) 

2-5  CRIMES COMMITTED (1978-1981) 

3-1  SUMMARY OF TRANSIT POLICING OPERATIONS IN CASE STUDY CITIES 

7-1  RATING OF PERSONAL SAFETY ON BUSES 

 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADW         Assault with Deadly Weapon

AVM         Automatic Vehicle Monitoring

CBD         Central Business District

CTAC        Citizen's Transit Advisory Committee

D-DOT       Detroit Department of Transportation

HEAVY       Human Efforts Aimed at Vitalizing Youth

LAPD        Los Angeles Police Department

MARTA       Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

MBTA        Massachsuetts Bay Transportation Authority

METRO       Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle

MUNI        San Francisco Municipal Railway

PA Transit  Port Authority of Allegheny County Transit

PCP         Phencyclidine Hydrochloride

RTD         Regional Transportation District-Denver

SCRTD       Southern California Rapid Transit District

SEMTA       Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority

SEPTA       Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

SMSA        Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

SPD         Seattle Police Department

TSC         Transportation Systems Center

UMTA        Urban Mass Transportation Administration

UPO         Undercover Police Operations

WMATA       Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

 

 

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

    Over the last fifteen years crime in the United States has created a growing problem in urban areas. Not only is the number of crimes committed skyrocketing, but the increase in the number of crimes per capita, a more appropriate measure, indicates that the possibility of an individual being a victim is increasing. Transit crime is not distinguished from other crime in the national statistics, but transit systems report a surge in crimes against passengers as well as property. Bus hijacking and "stagecoach" robberies have caught the media's attention, and passengers, recounting numerous stories of robberies and harassment that have occurred on the transit system, are increasingly aware of these crimes. Consequently, transit managers have had to direct more attention and resources toward improving passenger and operator security. This is not to say that transit security is solely the responsibility of transit management because the crime that does occur is also the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency. Transit systems have taken various steps to improve transit security. The measures taken range from improved security equipment to increased policing of the transit system.

    This study examines the measures taken by the principal systems in each of four cities- -Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, and Pittsburgh. A new measure does not function in isolation and must therefore be considered in the context of the conditions under which it is implemented. The magnitude of the crime problem, the procedures and equipment already in effect, and other new measures will influence the effectiveness of the measure. For example, implementation of an undercover police operation may require new communications equipment or may utilize equipment already in place. Often a community relations program will be used to reinforce specific security measures.

    This report examines the measures used by the four case study transit systems and the conditions under which they are most likely to be effective. It is intended that this information will be useful to other transit systems which may re-evaluate their security programs and consider additional measures. The study was limited to bus systems.

    Certain transit security measures are common to all four transit systems. All have means of policing their systems, communications equipment, and community or school programs. However, the composition of the policing group varies as does available equipment, and the type of school and community programs. There are unique aspects to each city's program. The organization of Detroit's undercover police operations has been used as a model by many other cities; Los Angeles has demonstration projects using sophisticated equipment; Seattle has a stress-management program for its bus operators; and the Pittsburgh system's small but effective police force enhances operators' and passengers' perceptions of security by responding to operator and passenger reports of problem areas.

    This section provides an introduction to the problem of transit crime and the security measures taken to combat it. Section 2 describes the transit security programs in the four selected cities, the case studies of this report. Section 3 describes and compares the methods used to police bus transit systems. Section 4 examines the surveillance and communications equipment used by the four systems. Section 5 deals with school and community education programs and training of operators. The comparative costs of the various measures are discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 discusses the public's perception of transit crime. Section 8 summarizes the effectiveness of the measures and presents recommendations based on the data collected.

1.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TRANSIT PASSENGER SECURITY

    Passenger security has always been a concern of transit management. Rules governing rowdy, disruptive behavior on transit systems were instituted widely in the early 1900s, and some transit companies were authorized to operate their own police forces. In some cities, the transit vehicle operators were permitted to carry weapons to protect themselves. However, policing of bus (and trolley) systems was usually the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency.(1) Historical records of transit crime are rare and consist primarily of anecdotal excerpts from books and newspapers.(2) Transit crime did not attract the public's attention as a serious problem until the late 1950s. Increasingly, the large metropolitan areas like New York and Chicago saw their urban discontent and growing street crime reflected in increased transit crime. Vehicle operators were often victims of this crime because they were in charge of the fare box and they spend more time on the vehicles than the average passenger. In the period between 1965 and 1970, union demands for safer working conditions were a major factor in the increased attention to the problem and the steps taken to control it. An important change was the institution of exact-fare policies to free operators of the need to handle currency and make them less attractive as targets.

    Transit and street crime continued to rise through the seventies, and pressure increased on bus transit systems to provide a secure environment for their passengers. Recent studies of transit crime has recommended new subway designs to create an environment that would deter and prevent crime, but these designs cannot usually be applied to bus systems. Increased policing and improved communications such as alarm systems are now being adopted by the bus transit systems in many cities including Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Pittsburgh as described in (see Section 2).

    Crime that threatens transit passengers' personal safety has only recently been categorized as a distinct type of crime. However, the distinction between transit crime and street crime is not always clear. If a passenger is assaulted while waiting at a bus stop, is that transit crime? If it is, what about crimes against passengers walking to the bus stop. Crime that occurs on a transit system is part of the crime that occurs on the street because streets are a part of most transit systems. Not surprisingly, high rates of transit crime occur most often in neighborhoods with high crime rates.3) To examine transit passenger security apart from the security of the person on the street, it is necessary to stipulate a working definition of the subject, especially since the definition of transit crime statistics has not been standardized. Thus, while some transit systems have a broad definition of transit crime, others restrict their definitions, and subsequent data collection, to only those incidents which occur on the transit vehicles and in subway stations. However, Detroit's transit crime statistics include those crimes which occur at bus stops; consequently, some of that city's security programs include the policing of bus stops. In this report, when a particular city is considered, the scope of its statistics will be noted.

1.3 DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES

    An effective security measure would decrease the existing threat to passengers' personal security, but appropriate means of evaluating the existing threat and changes in it are subject to debate. A statistic which lumps together all criminal incidents does not reflect the seriousness of the incidents: a large number of homicides represents more of a threat than a large number of fare evasions. A better representation of the threat to passenger security is afforded by the use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's uniform crime reporting classifications of Part I and Part II crimes. The most serious Part I offenses include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Part II crimes are simple assaults, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, buying and receiving stolen property, vandalism, possession of deadly weapons, prostitution, and other sex offenses.(4) However, these classifications are not uniformly used by the nation's transit systems.

    In addition to the lack of uniform crime classifications, the procedures for reporting transit crime incidents do not ensure accurate, comparable statistics. Most transit systems require vehicle operators to file reports of "unusual" incidents, including traffic accidents, criminal incidents, and medical emergencies. These reports provide an official record for use in the event of subsequent legal action as well as crime statistics for use in transit security operations. There are several difficulties with this reporting system, most notably a lack of incentive for the vehicle operator to file complete and accurate reports and the operator's inability to observe all activity that occurs in the vehicle while driving. The incentive to file a full report comes primarily from the protection it provides the operator if a law suit results from the incident. If an altercation with a passenger leads to an assault, the operator can ensure that an official record exists of his or her side of the story. Some systems pay their operators the equivalent of the estimated time required to fill out the forms. However, consultations with operators and union officials indicated that some operators disliked filling out the forms because writing full accounts of an incident requires too much time (even if there is some compensation) and filing reports, generally, seems to be a waste of time. Another difficulty with operator reports is their potential misuse by unions to reinforce demands for greater operator security as part of the bargaining process. Operators may be more likely to file reports if crimes against operators are to be the subject of union bargaining.

    Furthermore, operators are more likely to report incidents involving themselves than incidents between passengers. Any reporting of passenger-passenger offenses will depend on the seriousness of the offense. Less serious crimes against passengers and "victimless" crimes are less likely to be reported. An operator's principal responsibility is to drive the bus, not to police it, and a pocket-picking or pursesnatching may not always be observed. Even when an incident is observed, the operator is usually not in a position to intervene, and there is little subsequent incentive for the operator to fill out a lengthy report on all observed incidents. Operators may not report minor offenses such as public consumption of alcohol or narcotics if there is no disruption of the bus environment or harassment of other passengers.

    Another source of data on transit crime is the local law enforcement agency or the transit police force, if there is one. In the past, most law enforcement agencies have not reported transit crime separately from other crime. However, reporting practices are changing in those cities which have police units dedicated to policing the transit system. Such police reports provide data on transit crime which are independent of operator reports and which more accurately reflect passenger crime. However, the usefulness of police reports is limited because the number of reported incidents depends in part on the number of officers patrolling the system. An increased police presence will usually result in more criminal incidents being observed and reported. Furthermore, if police assignments are changed to provide more coverage of an area experiencing higher crime rates, the number of reported incidents may increase. Consequently police reports must be used cautiously in evaluating the incidence of crime and the effects of transit security measures. Victim reports to the transit system do not present these disadvantages, but not all crimes are reported by victims. Although some victims do complain directly to the transit system, there was no indication in the cities visited that a count of passenger complaints would accurately reflect the number of crimes committed.

    Even if accurate figures were available on the number of transit crimes of all types, the actual number of incidents might not represent the real threat to passenger security. If ridership and service are increasing at a greater rate than the incidence of crime, the threat to the individual passenger may be decreasing. Although there is no consensus on how to accurately measure a passenger's exposure to transit crime, suggested criteria include the number of riders, passenger miles, vehicle miles, the number of vehicles, and the average number of people on a bus per hour.(1) Many transit systems do not collect all of these data, and examination of the trends in the incidence of transit crime must then depend on rough estimates of the two more common measures of exposure: ridership and vehicle miles. Changes in the number of incidents per million passengers may be due to changes in trip length rather than in criminal activity. Similarly, changes in the number of incidents per million vehicle miles may reflect changes in the number of passengers per vehicle. A measure of the threat to passengers should relate the number of offenses to some measure of the number of passengers and the length of time they are exposed to the possibility of transit crime.

    There are other problems in using changes in transit crime rates to indicate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a particular security measure. An examination of the rates before and after implementing the measure does not provide information on what the rate would have been without the measure. In spite of the adoption of a security measure, transit crime might increase because the service area had experienced increased crime, but the increase in transit crime might have been larger if the measure had not been implemented. In addition, a single measure is rarely implemented without corresponding changes in other security programs and equipment, and the effects of the different programs are not always distinguishable. Consequently, changes in the crime rate must be examined in a broader context when they are used to judge the impact of a security measure.

1.4 SELECTION OF FOUR CITIES FOR CASE STUDIES

    The four cities selected for case studies were chosen from an initial list of thirty-four cities by a process of elimination. The initial list consisted of the thirty largest urbanized areas listed in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration's 1981 Directory of Regularly Scheduled. Fixed Route, Local Public Transportation Service in Urbanized Areas Over 50,000 Population, and four additional cities which had implemented specific security measures that might be of interest. (See Table 1-1.)

    New York and Chicago were eliminated immediately. In the case of New York, the complexity and magnitude of the system and its security problems put it beyond the scope of the current study. The city of Chicago was not considered because some of its transit security measures are being evaluated by other UMTA programs, and recently that security system was radically altered.

TABLE 1-1. CITIES CONSIDERED FOR TRANSIT SECURITY CASE STUDIES, RANKED BY POPULATION

    Because bus systems are more common than rail in the United States, consideration was limited to cities having a significant bus transit system. Consideration was further limited to those cities for which published transit crime statistics were readily available. The most complete source of information on transit crime is the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments' (SEMCOG) Crime and Security Measures on Public Transportation Systems; A National Assessment, published July 1981.(5) A list of twenty-nine cities considered in the SEMCOG study and summaries of the transit crime statistics for their principal systems appear in Tables 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4.

    The following criteria were used to reduce the number of cities considered for the case studies reported herein:

1.  Group III Systems (less than 20 million passengers per year) were not recommended as candidates for this study. These transit systems have, in general, less crime than the larger systems, principally because the cities themselves have less crime. Consequently, security measures introduced into these systems are likely to be less applicable to other systems with significant security problems.

2.  Cities with a high incidence of crime were considered because these are the cities in which security measures are most severely tested.

3.  Cities with large decreases in the crime rate were recommended for consideration in this study because they demonstrate where security measures may have been effective.

4.  Cities that have installed specific security programs that may be of critical interest were also considered to be good candidates for case studies. The resulting list of fifteen cities selected for further consideration and comments on their security program is shown in Table 1-5 and 1-6.

    Telephone conversations with transit officials in these cities provided more information on their transit security programs and the availability of statistical data. The number of cities under consideration was eventually reduced, in consultations with UMTA, to four: Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Pittsburgh. The transit systems in each of these cities had collected information on the incidence of transit crime and had successfully implemented security measures that could be applied elsewhere. Together, these cities provided reasonable geographic coverage of the United States and represented a range of metropolitan populations from the second largest to the nineteenth largest.

TABLE 1-2. SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS: GROUP I SYSTEMS
(Over 100 Million Passengers/Year)

 

TABLE 1-3. SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS: GROUP II SYSTEMS
(20 to 100 Million Passengers/Year)

TABLE 1-4. SEMCOG SUMMARIES OF TRANSIT SYSTEM CRIME STATISTICS: GROUP III SYSTEMS
(Less than 20 Million Passengers/Year)

 

  N/A - Not Available.

*Number of passengers in 1980 based on average daily rate for 260 days. 1977 Part II offenses included observation of marijuana use but not arrest; these incidents were not included in 1980 statistics.

   **From WMATA statistics.

   ***Includes start-up of rail system in 1980 statistics.

   Source: Reference 5.

TABLE 1-5. GROUP I SYSTEMS CANDIDATES FOR TRANSIT SECURITY STUDY SITES

TABLE 1-6. GROUP II SYSTEMS CANDIDATES FOR TRANSIT SECURITY STUDY SITES

 

  *The number of offenses went from 0 in 1977 to 28 in 1980.

2. CITY CASE STUDIES

    Case studies of the security measures adopted in Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Pittsburgh were developed from published data and interviews with transit and police officials. In each city detailed discussions were held with those in charge of the transit security programs including the chief of the transit police or the supervisor of the local police unit responsible for transit security, the transit official directly responsible for the security program, community relations personnel, and local police officials. A list of the people contacted in each of the four cities is attached in Appendix A. The public's perception of transit security as expressed in meetings with civic leaders was used to fill in the picture of the crime problems faced by each transit system and the countermeasures taken to improve the security of operators and passengers. This section presents a profile of each city including the transit security measures adopted, the alternatives considered, and distinguishing characteristics of the transit system.

2.1 DETROIT

    The Detroit metropolitan area experienced a sharp increase in overall crime in the mid-seventies, and many of the city's victims were bus operators and passengers. To provide more protection on the buses and at bus stops, the Detroit Police Department and the Detroit Department of Transportation (D-DOT) instituted the Bluebirds, an undercover police operation. In this program, teams of three and four Detroit police officers ride buses on the lines with a high incidence of crime. The presence of the officers makes possible immediate apprehension of those involved in criminal activity. D-DOT hopes that this tactic will discourage the growth of crime on its buses. In a typical operation, two or three officers ride the bus in plain clothes, and another officer in uniform follows in an unmarked car. The plain clothes officers are equipped with concealed radios, which enable them to call for additional help and communicate with the uniformed officer in the trail car.

2.1.1 Development of the Bluebirds and Alternatives Considered

    During the mid-seventies when serious crime was increasing in the city of Detroit, buses seemed to provide an attractive environment for vandalism and crime. While Part I crime in the city increased by 7 percent per annum between 1970 and 1975, during this same period, reported Part I transit crime increased by 115 percent. (4) All transit offenses, including minor vandalism, increased by 52 percent during this period. Transit crime continued to grow in the later seventies and reported Part I offenses increased by 40 percent between 1974 and 1976. (6) To cope with crime, including the rape of a woman driver and the occurrence of stage robberies in which the operator and passengers on a bus were systematically robbed at gun point, D-DOT managers considered various means of policing the transit system -- its terminals, vehicles, and coach stops.

    Most of D-DOT's transit crime falls in the Detroit Police Department's jurisdiction because the transit system's routes are confined almost entirely to the city. Prior to the Bluebird Operation, the police handled problems as they arose but did not target transit crime for special operations. Consultations between D-DOT management and the police led to a program of assigning uniformed officers to ride buses or runs with high incidence of crime, but the effectiveness of this program was limited. Few crimes were committed in front of the officers, but the absence of crime was conspicuous and anecdotal evidence indicated some offenses were subsequently committed in reaction to the presence of the uniformed officers. According to transit and police officials, there would be no criminal incidents when an officer was on a particular run, but the next day, some offenders would harass the passengers and drivers pointing out that as long as no officer was present they (i.e., the offenders) could do as they pleased. Since the deterent effect of uniformed officers was limited to the time they were present on the vehicle and since there may have been a subsequent negative impact, the use of uniformed officers did not seem to be as potentially effective as undercover officers. In addition, the drivers, accustomed to operating independent of supervision, were not all pleased at the presence of uniformed officers on their buses.

    Since the presence of uniformed officers was not found to be satisfactory, plain clothes officers were used for a period of time. They boarded with their police identification and rode the buses with the most severe problems. This program was not found to be very effective, either, mainly because it lacked operator support. Some operators, knowing that there was a police officer on the bus, would provoke incidents with passengers who had previously harassed the driver or other passengers. It was thought that other drivers, knowing they had police back-up, were less likely to avoid confrontations with hostile passengers than they would have done in the absence of police. In some cases, the drivers revealed the officers' presence to the passengers, thus destroying the effectiveness of the undercover police and occasionally provoking confrontations between passengers and officers.

    During discussions between D-DOT and the police department, a police officer who had previously been employed as a bus driver suggested an undercover police operation on the buses in which the officers boarded without the operator's knowledge. The two agencies developed a pilot project using plain clothes officers who would board with transfers rather than with their police identification. This eliminated some of the problems caused by the bus operators. One of the advantages of an undercover operation was its potential for controlling crime without complete police coverage of every bus on every line. If criminal activity could be prevented by increasing the probability of immediate apprehension by an unidentifiable officer on the bus, then an officer on each bus would not be necessary.

    The hiring of a transit security force was also seriously considered as an alternative to using Detroit police officers to patrol the system. As envisioned by D-DOT, the security force would not have had police power, and without this authority, neither transit nor police officials felt that the security force could have been effective in controlling criminal activity. On the crowded buses in particular, the harassment of passengers by groups of young people and the robbery of passengers by teams of criminals prevails. Without arrest powers, security officers would have had difficulty controlling groups of disruptive passengers. Thus, D-DOT felt that the solution lay in some sort of police presence.

    In 1976 D-DOT entered into a purchase of services contract with the Detroit Police Department to provide a police detail which would conduct undercover operations on the transit system. Consequently, the police department formed the Bluebird Detail, which was dedicated to policing the transit system. Funding was originally provided by a $901,000 grant from the Michigan Department of State Highways, and the detail was originally staffed by twelve teams composed of four officers each. Three of the officers in plain clothes would board the bus separately and, to avoid alerting the driver who might reveal the officers' presence, they used transfers rather than special passes. The fourth officer, in uniform, was responsible for following the bus at a distance in an unmarked car while maintaining radio contact with those officers on the bus. The first officers for the Bluebird Detail were selected from volunteers in the elite Tactical Mobile Unit; each of them had at least ten years of service. Delays in obtaining the cars and the concealable radios delayed full implementation of the Bluebird operations until 1977.

2.1.2 Bluebird Operations

    Currently, participation in the Bluebird Detail is limited to officers who request a transfer to that unit because all undercover work is voluntary. These officers are subsequently screened to determine if they are suitable for undercover work and for assignment to the transit detail. Qualified officers are then assigned on the basis of seniority. Originally the Bluebirds were an all male unit because the assignments were based on seniority, and few women could qualify. With increasing numbers of women officers in the department with the required seniority, some are now being recruited for the detail. The detail is reputedly a highly professional unit which attracts top officers.

    The Bluebirds had always worked with the Police Department's Gang Squad and Major Crimes Unit, and in 1980 a Tactical Service Department consisting of those three units was organized. Cooperation with the other two units is essential to the effectiveness of the Bluebird Detail. Because groups of juveniles account for a large proportion of the violators on buses, the Bluebird's operations are often coordinated with those of the Gang Squad as well as with the Narcotics Squad's operations to control drug use on and off the buses.

    Because the Bluebird Detail deals almost exclusively with crime that occurs on buses and at bus stops, the officers have developed expertise which increases their efficiency, in dealing with incidents peculiar to the transit system. For example, the plain clothes officers' response to an incident on a bus depends on the seriousness of the crime. To avoid endangering passengers and revealing their identity, undercover officers will usually follow an offender off the bus and then write a ticket if an ordinance was violated or make an arrest for more serious infractions. When the operator or passengers are threatened with serious bodily harm, the officers intervene directly to prevent injury. The uniformed officer in the unmarked trail car is always present at the time of arrest to remove any doubt in the offender's mind that he or she is indeed with the police. The officers' attention is not confined to the bus, and they are instructed to be aware of problems on the street because bus stops are often the scenes of purse snatches and pickpocket operations.

    In addition to patrolling the buses, Bluebird officers are occasionally called on to handle incidents that occur in the neighborhood of their assigned bus routes. The trail car provides transportation for the team if it must respond to close-by, nontransit crime. This availability for response to incidents is important to the police department to ensure efficient allocation of manpower. The detail's officers are held accountable for logging all their daily activities. They are required to ride a specified number of buses each week, filing reports on all incidents and reporting the mileage of the unmarked car.

    The police and transit officials consulted preferred teams of four officers, but recent budget cuts have required the reduction of the teams to three officers. The effectiveness of three-person and four-person teams is being investigated as part of an evaluation of the Bluebirds by Dr. Ken Weiner at Wayne State University. The reason for the presence of more than one plain clothes officer on the bus is the need for closer, more immediate backup than is available from the officer in the trail car. If an incident occurs on the bus, not only is the trail officer unable to lend immediate assistance, but he or she may not even be aware that a problem exists. Three officers in plain clothes on the vehicle were considered more effective than two because, with at least three officers on board the bus, if two officers need to disembark to follow on offender, one officer will be able to remain on the bus, and vice versa. Moreover, many incidents involve groups of passengers, particularly juveniles on the school runs. Especially in the close quarters of a bus, incidents involving several people can require several officers to protect passengers or operators. There was a consensus among transit and police officials that three officers on a team were the smallest number that could be effective in this type of operation.

    In publicizing the new security program DOT sought to inform the public and potential criminals that there would be undercover officers on the buses. One part of the publicity campaign was a contest for school children to design a poster illustrating the presence of undercover officers who would protect passengers on the buses. The winning poster, a blue bird wearing a police cap hovering over a bus, with the slogan, "The Bluebirds are watching you," was displayed on the buses, and the child received a savings bond. Not all buses have had the posters continuously on display because they are often stolen, presumably to decorate someone's wall.

    There was heavy television news coverage of the detail when it began, as well as newspaper articles describing the detail and some of its larger operations. One newspaper article reported the use of a decoy bus to pick up junior high school students who had been harrassing passengers on a particular route. The undercover officers were on the bus when the students boarded, and subsequently identified the major troublemakers who harassed the decoy passengers and other students and were responsible for disrupting the bus ride. The undercover officers then identified themselves as police officers and transfered the students who were not involved to a regularly scheduled bus. The trouble makers were kept on the bus and taken to the police station, where citations were issued to some students and parents were notified to come to the station to take custody of the younger students. This early media coverage has fallen off, and inquiries to the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press in November 1981, indicated that there were no recent articles on the Bluebirds and that the newspapers did not keep clipping files under that heading. In fact, the persons contacted did not recognize the name "Bluebirds" in connection with the transit system, nor were they aware of the existence of an undercover police operation on the buses.

2.1.3 Additional Security Equipment and Related Programs

    The Detroit buses are equipped with two-way radios which enable the driver to communicate with the dispatcher and call for assistance in emergencies. Some vehicles are equipped with external flashers to indicate emergencies to patrol cars and passenger bystanders, but these devices have not been installed on all vehicles. Silent alarms enable the operator to notify the dispatcher of an emergency if the operator cannot talk freely. The usefulness of roof-top flashers has not been established, and there is no record of their having been used in a criminal incident. Silent alarms and two-way radios are considered the most useful security measures in serious incidents. Less serious occurrences such as juvenile rowdiness and harassment of passengers may not warrant calling for police assistance even when the operator cannot control the situation. In addition, the incident may be over and the criminal may have fled before the police can respond to the call. Nevertheless, the two-way radios and silent alarms are considered useful in serious situations because they provide the operator with a means of calling for assistance. Without communications, the operator as well as the passengers would be more vulnerable to crime and minor harassments. The main usefulness of communications is in their potential for discouraging offenders who would perceive the bus and its occupants as ripe, isolated targets for crime.

    Because young people are the source of much vandalism and harassment of other passengers, D-DOT initiated school programs to teach them appropriate bus riding behavior and educate them about transit. Between April 1980 and June 1981, a pilot project was conducted in four metropolitan-area middle schools to disseminate general information on the public transit system including sections on the cost of vandalism and proper behavior on buses. Although the program increased the students' knowledge about transit, there was no indication of a change in attitude toward use of transit.(7)

2.1.4 D-DOT and the City It Serves

    The Detroit Department of Transportation operates primarily within the Detroit city limits and, therefore, within the Detroit Police Department's jurisdiction. D-DOT also serves two small incorporated areas that lie wholly within the city boundaries, Highland Park and Hamtramck, but Detroit police officers have no police power in these areas. The Southeast Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA) serves the suburbs located in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties but does not carry passengers travelling from one point in the city to another point in the city, because SEMTA cannot carry intra-city passengers. Within the city's boundaries, SEMTA's buses coming into the city only discharge passengers and its buses leaving the city only pick up passengers. However, SEMTA is the designated local transit grant recipient, and as such, receives state and federal subsidies and is responsible for their disbursement to D-DOT. A merger of the two systems has been mandated by the legislature, but a specific timetable has not been established. SEMTA owns all but 8 percent of D-DOT's capital equity and provides about 50 percent of D-DOT's operating funds, but the administration and operation of the two transit agencies remains separate. When the planned merger expands the number of law enforcement jurisdictions served by the unified transit system, there may be a need to reassess the staffing of the undercover operation. The Detroit Police do not have police authority outside the city limits and if there was a need to extend the Bluebird operations to the routes now served by SEMTA, some adjustments in jurisdiction or staffing would have to be made.

    D-DOT carried 64,380,000 passengers over 28 million vehicle-miles in fiscal 1981. To provide this service the agency has 799 buses and over a thousand employees. With the urban flight of the seventies, the city's population dropped by 20 percent between 1970 and 1980. Bus ridership declined during this period by an even greater percentage, 36 percent. The population shift to the suburbs is also reflected in SEMTA's growing ridership, from 7,349,186 in 1975 to over 11 million in 1980. Although the shift in population contributed to D-DOT's declining ridership, the increase in transit crime in 1974 and 1975 may have also discouraged passengers.

    In 1975, SEMCOG began a study of transit crime in Detroit. At first the data on transit crime was based entirely on operator reports since the Detroit Police Department did not distinguish occurrences of transit crime from other crime. D-DOT and SEMTA operators file reports on any "unusual" incidents including crime. These reports are used as evidence should a law suit or criminal prosecution occur; therefore, it is in the operator's interest to accurately report incidents. Operator reports include a description of the incident, the location, time, weather and light conditions, number of passengers, and number of witnesses.

    Additional reports on transit crime became available as they began to be extracted from other police-reported crimes when the Bluebird Detail was implemented. When a driver calls in a report of an incident in progress on the bus or at a bus stop usually the closest Bluebird team responds. The incidents reported by the detail are available as one source of transit crime data. The other source is the Crime Analysis Unit which responds when a Bluebird unit is not immediately available. Crime Analysis reports include Part I crimes that are transit-related. However, the Bluebirds report both Part I and Part II offenses. Reports from both units are crosschecked with those from operators to avoid double counting of incidents. Ms. Anne Nolan, who is responsible for this reporting program, indicated that she had not encountered any duplication of driver reports by either the Bluebird or Crime Analysis units. It may be that when there is a major incident in which the Bluebird officers identify themselves or when other officers respond, the operator may not feel it necessary to report the incident. It is also possible that some offenses such as purse-snatching may not be noted by the operator.

    Because transit crime reporting was expanded in 1977 to include the incidents that involved the Bluebird Detail and the transit-related crimes reported to the Crime Analysis Unit, the pre-1977 transit crime figures are not strictly comparable with the later figures. As mentioned in Section 1, there are problems inherent in the reporting procedures: the number of offenses reported by the detail itself is a function of the number of officers assigned. If the size of the undercover police force increases or decreases there may be a corresponding change in the reporting of incidents.

    The trend in Part I transit offenses reported by the various agencies is shown in Figure 2-1. Part I offenses reported by operators dropped sharply with the initiation of undercover police operations and continued to decline in the subsequent years. The number of incidents reported by the Bluebird Detail declined through 1979, but rose in 1980. The number of crimes reported by the Crime Analysis Unit in 1980 was unchanged from the number reported in 1977, although the 1979 figure was significantly lower. However, the incidents reported by the Crime Analysis Unit include a large number of crimes committed at bus stops and on the streets which are not as amenable to transit security measures as the environment of a transit vehicle.

    Figure 2-2 shows that the total number of Part I offenses per passenger dropped between 1977 and 1980 and reached its lowest point in 1979. (Information illustrated was calculated from data published in Reference 6.) Therefore, the decrease in reported transit crime was apparently not the result of declining ridership. However, the 1980 increase in crime per passenger was due to the increase in Crime Analysis Unit-reported crime, which includes a higher percentage of bus stop and off-vehicle crimes. The trend of operator-and Bluebird-reported incidents per passenger, excluding incidents reported by the Crime Analysis Unit, is more definitely downward.

    The transit crime problem has not been confined to serious incidents. As shown in Figure 2-3, there were 1,283 Part II criminal incidents reported in 1975. These minor offenses include public drunkenness and disorderly conduct, vandalism, and narcotic offenses. Forty-eight percent of the 1980 offenses were incidents of vandalism. Since 1975, there has been a significant decrease in the number of offenses reported by operators. The number reported by the Bluebird Detail has also declined significantly.

Source: Reference 6, p. 7.
NOTE: 1977 was the first full year of Bluebird operation.

FIGURE 2-1. PART I TRANSIT OFFENSES, 1979-1980

Source: Reference 6.

FIGURE 2-2. NUMBER OF REPORTED PART I CRIMES PER MILLION PASSENGERS

Source: Reference 6, p. 9.

FIGURE 2-3. PART II TRANSIT OFFENSES REPORTED BY D-DOT AND BLUEBIRDS, 1970-1980.

    The trend in the number of transit crimes is similar to that of the total crime rate in the Detroit metropolitan area which exploded in 1974 and 1975. As indicated in Figure 2-4, the number of crimes per capita increased by over 50 percent between 1970 and 1975. During this period, the number of Part I crimes reported on D-DOT buses increased by 133 percent, and the number per passenger increased by 200 percent.(6) Although transit crime grew more than total crime, it seems to have been part of a larger crime problem that the Detroit area experienced. The number of metropolitan area crimes as well as the incidents per capita dropped over the next three years (1976-1978). The reason for this improvement is unknown, but it might be attributable to an improving economy or more efficient law enforcement. While certain socio-economic conditions, such as unemployment, may not directly cause crime, changes in these factors are often associated with changes in the crime rate. The 1979 and 1980 recessions hit Detroit hard: area employment dropped by 8.9 percent between 1978 and 1980, and the unemployment rate doubled. As shown in Figure 2-4, the crime rate did increase dramatically during these two years. However, other factors, such as cutbacks in the number of law enforcement officers, could have also contributed to the increase in crime.

    As part of the city's crime, transit crime may also be related to socio-economic factors. The city-wide crime per capita figures are not strictly comparable with those for D-DOT's transit crime. Nevertheless, the decline in Detroit's crime over the 1975-1978 period suggests that transit crime might have decreased somewhat even without the implementation of any transit security measures. However, the number of transit crime incidents per passenger continued to decrease in 1979 when the city crime rate was increasing. This suggests that the security measures implemented by D-DOT did contribute to the decrease in transit crime.

Source: Reference 4.

FIGURE 2-4. INCIDENCE OF CRIME PER MILLION INHABITANTS IN DETROIT SMSA

2.2 LOS ANGELES

    The nationwide growth of crime in the seventies was felt strongly in Los Angeles. The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), which provides bus service to the metropolitan Los Angeles area, experienced a 40 percent increase in crimes against operators and passengers and a doubling in the number of buses hijacked in one year (1977). To cope with this crime problem, SCRTD obtained legislative authority to operate a transit police force with full police powers. Los Angeles has also been the site for pilot tests of an automatic vehicle monitoring (AVM) system and the use of cameras to provide additional passenger security.

2.2.1 Development of the SCRTD Transit Police Force

    Prior to 1978, SCRTD had a security force with limited authority. Its responsibilities were confined to responding to traffic accidents and guarding SCRTD facilities and equipment. These security officers did not have police powers and were not responsible for passenger or operator security. All crime, including transit crime, fell under the jurisdiction of the local law enforcement agencies, with the bulk of the transit crime occurring within the city limits and within the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

    In 1977, in response to public concern about passenger security and union pressure to increase operator security, SCRTD decided to seek legislative authority for a transit police force staffed by officers with full police powers while on duty. The legislation passed and SCRTD was empowered to establish a transit police force. In July 1978, James P. Burgess, formerly a Captain in the Alhambra Police Department, was appointed Chief of the Transit Police and charged with developing a professional law enforcement organization. One purpose for the selection of a local police officer was that he would be more likely than a newcomer to command the respect of the local law enforcement agencies and to ensure their cooperation.

    The new transit police force incorporated the existing security force and offered those security officers who were qualified the opportunity to become sworn police officers. About forty security guards applied for police officer positions, and half of them passed the required examinations and training. The police force has a budget for seventy sworn officers and forty security guards, twenty-five of which are to be armed and fifteen are not. The security guards patrol the plants and oversee revenue transfers, but do not respond to reports of crime on SCRTD vehicles. The transit police recruits must meet the employment standards of the Los Angeles City and County Police Departments, and they go through the same training programs. The chief of the transit police plans to develop a high-quality force which will be taken seriously by passengers, operators, and offenders. According to him, a quality force is necessary to gain the respect of the local law enforcement officers and ensure their cooperation. As of December 1981, Chief Burgess had recruited and trained fifty-seven full time officers.

    To make up for the deficiency in permanent, full-time officers, off-duty law enforcement officers were hired as part-time transit police. The County of Los Angeles made available a $150,000 grant in October 1980, and an additional $225,000 in April 1981, to hire off-duty Los Angeles City and County Police officers. These officers are paid as hourly employees and are furnished with SCRTD identification. Working eight-hour shifts, two days a week, this part-time work force provided the equivalent of nineteen full-time officers in December 1981. After the transit force is fully staffed, Chief Burgess plans to phase out the part-time operation. Benefits of employing off-duty officers include the dissemination of information about the transit police operations and the facilitation of relationships with the police departments.

2.2.2 SCRTD Transit Police Operations

    The transit police operate both in uniform and undercover, and they are equipped with police cars bearing an SCRTD Transit Police insignia. The transit police use several modes of operation:

-   Undercover and uniformed officers work together. To better assess the impact of uniformed officers, the undercover officers have the opportunity to observe the effect of a uniformed officer's presence and what happens when the officer leaves.

-   Three-officer undercover teams are used with two officers on the bus and one following in an unmarked car.

-   Two undercover officers are used to work bus stops. These operations concentrate on pickpockets and the counterfeiting of passes.

-   Both uniformed and undercover officers randomly board buses.

Because the SCRTD system is so large, the transit police cannot police the entire system intensively. Instead, they concentrate their activities in high-crime areas. Officer assignments are determined by the areas experiencing the most problems. For example, in the summer, the beach lines tend to have more crime than in the winter and additional officers are assigned to cover them, especially on weekends. Nevertheless, all lines are patrolled occasionally to provide a measure of system-wide security and to monitor patterns of crime.

    Cooperation between operators and the transit police is encouraged through regular meetings to discuss what is happening in the buses and to solicit feedback on police operations from the operators. Operator training includes a section on how to handle emergencies and the role of the transit police. The transit police officers, for their part, receive some operator training to familiarize them with the operation of a bus and the difficulties faced by drivers.

    The transit police are primarily concerned with crime that occurs on SCRTD vehicles, and the officers' responsibilities in dealing with other transit crime are limited. They share the police duties with the local police and their official role is to provide assistance to the local law enforcement agency. If a transit police officer makes an arrest, he or she takes the offender to the nearest police station, where the local police take over. In this situation, the SCRTD officer is expected to take direction from the officer in charge of the facility according to a memo of understanding between the SCRTD Police and the local law enforcement agencies. Following an arrest by a transit officer, the requisite follow-up and investigative work are done by the local police. Transit police operations focus on deterring crime and apprehending criminals rather than on prosecution. Because the police responsibilities are shared, coordination with the local police is necessary to ensure efficient operations.

    When an incident occurs on a bus, the following sequence of events is typical of how the operator communicates the problem and how the police respond. If the incident is minor, the operator calls the dispatcher on the two-way radio and the dispatcher summons the police. If there is a serious incident and the operator does not wish to let the offender know he has called the police, the operator activates the silent alarm. An emergency message then flashes on the signboard normally used to indicate the bus's number and destination. At the same time, an alarm goes into the dispatch center, and the dispatcher must determine the location of the bus and notify the transit and local police. If the vehicle is part of the automatic vehicle monitoring (AVM) system (see Section 4), its location is continuously displayed on a monitoring screen, and the transit and local police can be notified immediately with accurate information on its location and direction of travel. However, the majority of buses and routes are not part of this demonstration program, and the dispatcher must determine the bus's route and schedule and estimate its probable location. Under these circumstances the location information relayed to the transit police and the appropriate local law enforce ment agency may not be correct. Usually both police forces dispatch units to the bus. However, if the transit police do not have a unit reasonably near the bus they leave it to local police to respond to the call. On the other hand, the transit police often can respond more quickly than the local police to incidents at downtown locations. As soon as it is possible for the operator to talk safely, he or she activates a priority switch on the two -way radio and tells the dispatcher what has occurred.

    There are two major problems that the police face when responding to silent alarm emergencies: the high frequency of false alarms and the time required to reach the bus. Response time is highly dependent on the location of available officers and on immediate and accurate knowledge of the bus's location. Delays are likely when no transit officers are available to respond, or the bus is off-route and difficult to locate. The transit police are trying to develop better procedures to handle emergencies and to improve their response time without relying on the AVM because of its limited service area. The high number of false alarms (half of all alarms received) is at least partly due to the switch's location on the floor of the vehicle near the brake. Many times the switch is activated without the operator's knowledge, and some times the maintenance crews inadvertently activate the alarms. To alleviate these problems, the switch is being relocated in the side window panel with other operational switches.

    Since not all the violations that occur on a bus are serious enough to warrant an arrest, SCRTD transit police officers sought and were granted citation authority which enables them to enforce SCRTD rules against unacceptable activities such as eating, smoking, drinking, and playing loud radios on the bus. Effective January 1 1982, any California transit district with a sworn police force will be authorized to issue citations for minor infractions of the law, and the transit district will receive 85 percent of the fines collected. This additional authority is expected to help transit police control less serious incidents.

2.2.3 SCRTD Coordination with Local Law Enforcement Agencies

    The SCRTD bus routes cross forty-six separate law enforcement jurisdictions. The center of its operations is the city of Los Angeles, but its bus routes do extend into the surrounding Los Angeles County. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has jurisdiction over the city and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department serves the unincorporated areas in the county. Some smaller municipalities also contract with the sheriff's department for police services rather than institute a force of their own. The county sheriffs also provide specialized police services in cases of homicide, narcotics, and vice control even in those municipalities with their own police force. These multiple jurisdictions were one reason for the institution of a transit police force with the authority to arrest offenders in any jurisdiction. SCRTD works closely with LAPD and the sheriff's department. SCRTD encourages all local law enforcement officers to ride the bus to and from work by allowing them free rides when they show their identification. This is by far the least expensive security measure used.

    Until the institution of the SCRTD police, LAPD had sole jurisdiction over transit-related crime committed in the city. Now it shares, with the SCRTD transit police, responsibility for incidents that occur on buses as well as those at bus stops. LAPD notifies the SCRTD transit police of any police activities that could involve the transit system, such as planned boardings by either uniformed or undercover officers; this notification procedure allows SCRTD officers to be deployed in other areas to increase police coverage and avoids inadvertant interruption of LAPD operations.

    Since transit crime requires city-wide coordination, it is under the jurisdiction of the LAPD Metropolitan Division, which has police responsibilities throughout the whole city. This division controls the seventeen LAPD helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft, which patrol the Los Angeles area. The helicopters patrol the city daily. When there is a hijacking or a bus is off-route, the officers in the helicopters can spot the bus by its identification number, which is painted on the roof. These resources of the LAPD are available to the SCRTD Police when they are needed.

    The Metropolitan Division of LAPD does monitor transit crime, and after identification of emerging patterns of incidents, it develops operations to deter or prevent these incidents. When there are frequent transit crimes in an area, the division develops a profile of the type of crime and the routes it occurs on. If the incidents are the less serious and repressible types of crime, such as juvenile vandalism, uniformed officers are assigned to the area. Their visible presence usually discourages the offenders. If the crimes are more serious, undercover and uniformed officers may be assigned to particular operations on the buses or at the bus stops. Occasionally more elaborate, covert operations involving extensive undercover work are conducted.

    LAPD undercover operations use the following three approaches:

Plain clothes surveillance of problem areas, which includes observing activity on the buses, staking out bus stops where robberies and purse-snatches occur, and providing saturation of the problem areas for quick response to bus alarms (radio, flashers, and message board).

Undercover ride-along and tail vehicle. In this procedure the officers make arrests on board the bus and take the suspect off the bus to the tail car.

Undercover observation with radio, reporting to officers at bus stops and/or in tail vehicles. In this mode, the officer doesn't identify himself but instead relays information on criminal or suspicious activity to other officers. This method allows the officer to continue to operate without detection. This method ensures less chance of an altercation on the bus wherein an operator or passenger could be accidentally injured. ^*

    A saturation operation run by LAPD is of interest because it illustrates the difficulty in eliminating transit crime. In November 1980, LAPD began an operation which attempted to eliminate all transit crime in a high-crime area and to determine the level of effort and cost required to do so. Even if it was a limited success and only displaced crime to another area there would be some cost-effectiveness data generated. Officers were assigned to the area on a 24-hour basis, and the criminal activity did decrease as the word went out that the neighborhood was crawling with police officers. However, there always seemed to be a few people.who "hadn't gotten the word," stumbled into the operation, and were arrested. Because of budget considerations the operation was discontinued before all transit crime was eliminated. However, the possibility of totally eliminating transit crime seemed bleak.

    The budget and personnel restrictions that resulted from passage of Proposition 13 have caused LAPD to discontinue some of its transit crime operations. The SCRTD police force had been created to deal with transit crime, and duplication of effort could no longer be afforded.

    Like LAPD, the sheriff's department also cooperates with the transit police. Its officers are not usually allowed to moonlight, but an exception was made in the case of SCRTD transit police part-time employment of off-duty local law enforcement officers. Off-duty county officers are also encouraged to ride SCRTD buses free upon showing their identification. These part-time employment and free bus service programs were positively received by the bus operators and apparently alleviated some of their previous hostility toward the county officers. Transit crime is not considered a major issue in the county and is not classified separately in its statistics. Security problems on the street as well as in automobiles are considered much more serious, and street crime is reputedly worse in some areas than is crime that occurs on buses. The community of Lynwood is typical. It currently has a high crime rate and the sheriff's department receives more complaints about attacks on occupants in cars than on buses. Incidence of crime on buses in Lynwood is reputedly very low; there have been only four incidents reported to the sheriff's department in the period from June to December 1981.

2.2.4 Additional Security Measures

    In addition to the two-way radios and silent alarms already in place, two other projects to improve security using equipment have been initiated in Los Angeles--the automatic vehicle monitoring (AVM) system and a camera monitoring program. The AVM was originally designed as a management tool to provide continuous and accurate information on the location of buses in the system as well as the number of passengers boarding and disembarking. Dispatchers can use the AVM to monitor schedules and to respond to emergencies, and SCRTD managers can use the data to develop future routes and schedules. In an emergency, the dispatcher can immediately notify the police of the exact location of the vehicle regardless of whether it is stopped or still moving. However, the monitoring equipment has not been installed throughout the city, and an AVM vehicle outside the system may not be automatically located when an emergency occurs. There have been delays in relaying silent alarm information, in part because of the high number of false alarms and because police response time depends on the dispatcher's immediate response to receiving an alarm. If the alarm is ignored or information relayed to the police is delayed, the response time will be increased. Police officials expressed concern that, in an emergency, immediate and accurate information on a vehicle's location should be disseminated promptly if immediacy is of value.

    SCRTD's other project was a pilot camera-on-bus monitoring program patterned after the use of cameras in banks. It's purpose was to document any crimes, to provide evidence in criminal cases, and to increase the probability of positive identification of the perpetrators. Cameras to be activated by operators were installed on SCRTD Grumman buses operating in high-crime areas. But the project became short-lived when the Grumman buses were found to be structurally defective and had to be taken out of service midway through the project. Based on a short period of use, the results of using cameras on buses were not conclusive. There was less vandalism reported on the test buses, but the incidence of other minor crimes increased. Additional details on the AVM and camera-on-bus projects can be found in Section 4.

    While additional security devices are being tested, problems have been encountered with the newly designed buses. The buses' dark tinted windows have been widely criticized by law enforcement officials as well as passengers. When police officers respond to a daytime emergency, they cannot see what is occurring in the bus and have difficulty assessing the situation. In addition, the windows, which are easily opened from the inside, allow offenders to escape and avoid apprehension.

    The use of specialized equipment is not the only measure taken to improve passenger security. The SCRTD community relations department also promotes citizen involvement in combating crime. These projects help educate the community about the transit security measures that SCRTD employs and often affect the public's perception of transit security.

    One community program to combat vandalism through a public relations and youth education campaign, called "Operation Teamwork," used Los Angeles Rams football players to popularize responsible transit behavior. Because of a lack of funds, the program was suspended in 1979. However, in response to requests by community leaders and a needs assessment which indicated that an SCRTD outreach to the community was necessary, Operation Teamwork was revived in 1981. In June 1981, two full-time positions and one internship were added to the SCRTD community relations staff. "Operation Teamwork" made twenty-two presentations to community groups in high-crime areas during October 1981. The program currently includes the following activities:

-   Community outreach and publications such as "Crime Prevention Tips and "How To Ride A Bus".

-   Youth education: poster and essay contest, peer tutoring and counseling, and youth employment.

-   Education: literature and curriculum development.

-   Victim and witness assistance for those testifying in court cases.

    Another community-oriented program was financed by a grant in 1980 to an organization called Project HEAVY (Human Efforts Aimed at Vitalizing Youth). This group operated an extensive public outreach program and promoted the use of its help-line to report transit crime incidents. A decision to renew their grant is pending review of the final report.

2.2.5 Los Angeles and the Southern California Rapid Transit District

    Created by the California legislature in 1964, the Southern California Rapid Transit District was given two mandates: to develop a rapid transit system for Los Angeles County, and to operate and improve the existing bus system. Design of the heavy-rail system is almost complete, but construction has not yet begun. As the major provider of the Los Angeles-Long Beach area's public transportation, SCRTD serves both the city and county of Los Angeles and seventy-seven separate municipalities. There are twenty-one other private and public transit agencies serving smaller communities in the metropolitan area, but more than half of these transit systems have fewer than twenty-five buses. As the largest all-bus transit systems in the United States, SCRTD has a total fleet of 2,913 buses, carrying 398 million passengers a year.

    SCRTD serves the second largest American metropolitan area, a population of 7,445,000. Unlike many large urban areas with a shrinking inner city and a growing suburban population, the growth of the city of Los Angeles has kept pace with that of the surrounding metropolitan area. Between 1970 and 1980, the population of the city grew by 9.1 percent and the entire area by 5.8 percent. Although Los Angeles is well known as an auto-oriented city, SCRTD transports an increasing number of passengers. A recent report showed that 45 percent of all persons entering the downtown area during the morning rush hour did so by bus. Between 1978 and 1980, bus ridership to the downtown area has increased by 18 percent. (8)

    The increase in transit crime which eventually led to the development of an SCRTD police force is presented in Table 2-1. These transit crime statistics were informally compiled from operator incident reports prior to the institution of the transit police. As indicated in the table, the number of reported incidents involving operators is much greater than those involving passengers. This may be a reporting bias caused by the lack of incentives for operators to report passenger crime and their limited awareness of passenger crime, as noted in Section 1. Nevertheless, the trends in the number of crimes against both passengers and operators increased significantly between 1970 and 1978.

    To better understand transit crime patterns and develop the information necessary to assign personnel to bus routes and areas of the city, the transit police have developed a more detailed and descriptive set of crime categories, and they collect more data than previously. Summaries of transit crime data are now compiled from reports of incidents that transit police have responded to. Data on incidents reported directly to the city and county police departments are not currently collected, but procedures are being implemented to allow the transit police to include these incidents in their future crime summaries. Although the transit police force is not yet fully staffed, reductions in the number of thefts and robberies against operators and passengers indicate some progress in improved SCRTD security. Table 2-2 includes the numbers of incidents reported by the transit police between 1979 and 1981. That ridership increased by 10 percent during this period suggests that the exposure of passengers to criminal offenses decreased as a result of SCRTD transit police work.

    The crime rate in the Los Angeles metropolitan area was relatively stable between 1974 and 1978 prior to a sharp upswing in the period 1978 to 1980, as noted in Figure 2-5. Between 1977 and 1980, the total number of crimes reported increased by 25 percent, and violent crime increased by 39 percent. The city of Los Angeles has had a higher overall crime rate than the metropolitan area, but the trends in the number of crimes per capita have been similar.

TABLE 2-1. OPERATOR-REPORTED TRANSIT CRIME, 1970-1978