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U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Transit
Administration
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Meeting Summary
11th Annual State Safety
Oversight Program Meeting
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Minneapolis, Minnesota
Millennium Hotel
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September 17 to 20, 2007
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Introduction
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) held its 11th Annual State Safety
Oversight Program Meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota - September 17 to 20, 2007.
This meeting was co-hosted by the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and
Metro Transit.
There were a total of 95 attendees at this year's meeting, including:
- 26 representatives from 24 State safety oversight (SSO) agencies;
- 42 representatives from 24 rail transit agencies;
- 12 representatives from FTA partners, including the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Operation Lifesaver, and universities participating in the University
Transportation Center (UTC) program; and
- 15 representatives from FTA, including FTA Headquarters, four FTA
Regional Offices, and FTA support staff.
Appendix A of this Meeting Summary contains the Participant List. The Annual
Meeting was facilitated by Mr. Levern McElveen, Safety Team Leader, FTA's Office
of Safety and Security. During the three-and-a-half days, presentations were
given by:
- Mr. Henry Hartberg, Senior Manager of Operations Safety, Dallas Area
Rapid Transit (DART);
- Mr. Craig Macdonald, Director of Risk Management, Claims, and Safety,
St. Louis Metro;
- Ms. Theresa Impastato, Safety Manager, New Jersey Transit, South New
Jersey Light Rail, River LINE;
- Mr. Nagal Shashidhara, Director of System Safety and Quality Assurance
Program for Light Rail Operations at New Jersey Transit;
- Ms. Violet Gunka, Illinois Regional Transit Authority;
- Mr. Mike Flanigon, Director, Office of Technology, Federal Transit
Administration;
- Ms. Lisa Colbert, Office of Research, Innovation and Demonstration,
Federal Transit Administration;
- Ms. Isabel Kaldenbach, National Director, Light Rail Safety Education,
Operation Lifesaver, Inc.;
- Dr. Beverly Sauer, Professor of the Practice-Managerial Communication,
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University;
- Mr. Thomas Farmer, Deputy General Manager, Mass Transit, TSA ;
- Mr. Peter Roe, Branch Chief, Surface Transportation Security Inspection
Program, TSA ;
- Mr. Jerry Shook, State Safety Oversight Program Manager, New York Public
Transportation Safety Board;
- Mr. Ronald Keele, Executive Director, Office of Safety and Risk
Management, Maryland Transit Administration;
- Ms. Elayne Berry, Executive Director of Safety and Quality Assurance,
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority; and
- Mr. Joe Diaz, System Safety and Security Officer, Hillsborough Area
Regional Transit Authority.
Sessions were also conducted by Mr. Michael Taborn, Director of FTA's Office
of Safety and Security, Mr. Richard Wong, with FTA's Office of Chief Counsel,
and Mr. Richard Gerhart, Security Team Leader with FTA's Office of Safety and
Security, to address:
- Current FTA initiatives, including coordination with TSA to implement
new requirements in H.R. 1, Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission;
- FTA's upcoming rule revision to address provisions in the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users (SAFETEA-LU), which affect Part 659's enabling legislation;
- Proposed responses to recent recommendations from the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation into the July 11, 2006
derailment at the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA);
- FTA's technical clarification letter regarding the hazard management
program requirements in Part 659; and
- FTA's
SSO Audit Program.
Presentations were also made by Ms. Annabelle Boyd, Mr. Jim Caton, and Mr.
Andy Lofton, contractors for FTA's
SSO Program, and by several
UTC representatives,
including:
- Dr. Reinhardt Brown, Interim Executive Director, South Carolina State
University, James E. Clyburn University Transportation Center;
- Dr. Jill Hough, Director, North Dakota University, Small Urban & Rural
Transit Center;
- Dr. Mahmud Farooque, Center/Managing Director, NEXTRANS Purdue, Regional
University Transportation Center; and
- Dr. Max Donath, Director, University of Minnesota, Intelligent
Transportation Systems Institute.
This year's annual meeting also included a break-out session focused on
identifying and managing hazardous conditions. Separate training sessions were
also provided for SSO personnel and
rail transit agency representatives to address specific issues and initiatives
relevant to their respective implementation of 49
CFR Part 659 requirements.
On Wednesday afternoon, September 19, 2007, Metro Transit provided a tour of
its alignment, Operations Control Center, Vehicle Maintenance Facility, Traction
Power Sub-Station, and gave a special presentation on its Track Worker
Protection Program.
Appendix B provides a listing of the contents of the CD-ROM included with
this Meeting Summary. This CD-ROM includes electronic copies of all viewgraph
presentations, handouts, and other materials distributed during the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting.
Appendix C provides the results of the evaluations received from the
participants of the 11th Annual SSO
Program Meeting, including recommendations for topics and issues to be addressed
at future meetings.
ORGANIZATION OF MEETING SUMMARY
The Meeting Summary presents the topics covered at the meeting and highlights
discussion points and identified action items. It is organized into the
following sections:
- Welcoming Remarks
- Status of SSO Audit Program
and Findings
- FTA's Hazard Management Program Clarification Letter
- Implementing FTA's Hazard Management Program Requirements
- Internet-Based Hazard Tracking Systems
- Identifying and Managing Hazards from the Internal Safety Audit
Process
- Identifying and Managing Hazards during Operations
- Approaches for Evaluating Hazard in the Rail Transit Environment
- Hazard Management Team Building Exercises
- NTSB
Investigation of the July 11, 2006 Derailment at the Chicago Transit
Authority
- Findings and Recommendations from
NTSB's
September 11, 2007 Hearing
- CTA and Illinois
RTA Post-Accident
Activities
- Impacts on FTA's
SSO Program
- University Transportation Center Research Programs
- Operation Lifesaver
- Partnering for Rail Transit Security Oversight
- Special Training Sessions
- SSO Agencies
- Rail Transit Agencies
Tour of Metro Transit Light Rail System
- Safety Credentials
- Effective Practices in Accident Investigation
1. WELCOMING REMARKS
Mr. Levern McElveen, Safety Team Leader for FTA's Office of
Safety and Security, kicked the meeting off by welcoming participants to
Minneapolis. Mr. McElveen explained that the agenda for the meeting had been
developed through a working group comprised of
SSO and rail transit agency representatives to include topics of interest
to the SSO
community. Mr. McElveen reviewed the agenda with the attendees, highlighting
break-out sessions, the tour at Metro Transit, and the welcome reception on
Monday night. Mr. McElveen then introduced Mr. Michael Taborn, Director, FTA's
Office of Safety and Security.
Michael Taborn, Director, FTA's Office of Safety and Security
Mr. Taborn welcomed everyone to the annual meeting and stated that attendance
was at an all alltimehigh. He commended the participants for their commitment to
the SSO Program and extended a
special thanks to the meeting's hosts, Deputy Commissioner Tim Leslie
and
Lt. Tim Rogotzke of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety
and Metro Transit's General Manager, Brian Lamb, along with
Mike Conlon and John MacQueen from Metro Transit's
Safety Department.
Mr. Taborn went on to state that
FTA conducts an ambitious program of oversight and technical assistance
activities designed to prevent public transportation fatalities, injuries,
property damage and system interruption, and to ensure the capability to respond
effectively to those accidents, security incidents, and emergencies that do
occur. Mr. Taborn noted that FY 2007 saw FTA's
greatest investment yet in supporting the safety, security and emergency
preparedness of the public transportation industry, and its strongest delivery
of programs, products, training, and services.
Specifically for the SSO Program,
in FY 2007, FTA:
- Updated its SSO Audit
Program to address recent revisions to 49
CFR Part 659 and to enhance to assessment of the quality of Part 659
implementation.
- Conducted nine audits of SSO
agencies using the revised audit process, with a 10th audit in process. FTA
is now on track to complete
SSO audits of all oversight
agencies by the end of FY 2009.
- Updated TSI 's Rail
System Safety Course to address Part 659 provisions, and provided three
course offerings. Through TSI
and NTI , FTA also provided
over 200 offerings of other courses designed to enhance the safety,
security, and emergency preparedness posture of the transit industry.
- Conducted the 2nd Annual Invitational Training Workshop for
SSO Program Managers in Tampa,
FL to support the professional develop of
SSO Program Managers and to enhance the quality of implementation of
49 CFR Part 659.
- Invited a representative group of
SSO
Program Managers to attend the two Transit Safety and Security Roundtables
offered in FY 2007. In the July Roundtable,
FTA conducted two sessions devoted to track worker protection and
maintenance oversight issues. FTA also facilitated a session with TSA
regarding security issues in the rail transit industry that highlighted
interaction with the SSO
program.
- Initiated an ambitious new training program for
SSO Program Managers, including
creation of a training curriculum and development of Individualized Training
Plans (ITPs) for each SSO
Program Manager to document how he or she will participate in the
SSO Training Curriculum over the
next three years.
- Completed and released FTA Guidance Circular 5800.1, Safety and Security
Management in Major Capital Projects. The guidance includes new requirements
for ensuring that safety and security are addressed during all phases of the
New Starts planning and development process.
- Completed an extensive analysis of the rail transit industry's safety
performance and developed FTA's 2007 Rail Transit Safety Action Plan, FTA's
revised Top 10 Safety Action Priorities, and supporting technical assistance
materials.
- Obtained funding to support
FTA's new Track Worker Protection and Maintenance Oversight program,
designed to enhance the safety of track workers and achieve improvements in
the safety oversight of critical maintenance functions.
Mr. Taborn next discussed the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
hearing, which was held Tuesday, September 11, 2007, to adopt findings and
recommendations from the NTSB's
investigation of the July 11, 2006 derailment at the Chicago Transit Authority
(CTA). Mr. Taborn noted that, during this hearing, the Board declared, very
publicly, its belief that the SSO
program is not sufficiently overseeing rail transit safety. Mr. Taborn stated
that the
NTSB believes FTA
should be requiring more and doing more to ensure rail transit safety on a
day-today basis.
Mr. Taborn noted that FTA is committed to working with the
NTSB, the nation's
rail transit agencies, and the State safety oversight agencies to address the
NTSB's recommendations
and to determine ways in which the SSO
program can be improved. Mr. Taborn also clarified that FTA is concerned that in
the investigative process used to assign responsibility for this derailment, the
NTSB did not
appropriately identify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the
involved parties as specified in 49
CFR Part 659. The
SSO rule has been developed to
bridge local, State, and Federal authorities and responsibilities for safety
oversight of rail transit agencies, and there are inherent challenges that must
be addressed every day in using this framework to identify and resolve safety
issues.
Mr. Taborn explained that it is understandable, in light of the facts of the
derailment at CTA, that the
NTSB believes
"someone" should have stepped in to do "something" to prevent the systemic
degradation of
CTA's track. However, it is
important to recognize that corrective actions cannot be required, and rail
transit agencies cannot be forced to address them, without appropriate
delegations of authority.
In the coming months, Mr. Taborn explained that FTA will be working at all
levels to review its enabling legislation to determine if there are ways that
FTA can provide rail transit safety managers,
SSO agencies, and FTA's own management of the
SSO Program with additional
authorities to require and enforce that actions be taken to identify and address
safety deficiencies.
Mr. Taborn urged the attendees to take similar actions within their own
agencies to identify opportunities for improvement in the management of their
safety programs and the enforcement of safety authorities.
In addition, Mr. Taborn noted that FTA has established a new Fire Safety and
Analysis Program in partnership with the National Association of State Fire
Marshals to analyze industry data regarding public transportation fires and to
develop recommendations for preventing and fighting fires in the public
transportation environment. It is FTA's hope that the findings from this program
will help to address
NTSB recommendations
regarding needed improvements in the management of "smoke in tunnel conditions"
at rail transit agencies.
Mr. Taborn also stated that in FY 2008, FTA
will be kicking off new initiatives to address track worker protection and
maintenance oversight issues in the rail transit industry. Mr. Taborn noted that
the safety, security, and emergency preparedness problems faced by the public
transportation industry are far more complex than those of 30 years ago, and
implementing solutions is therefore more challenging. Aging infrastructure and
increasing demands for rail transit service have raised risks for track workers
and passengers, and highlighted the need for additional safety oversight of
critical maintenance functions. Emerging technologies offer new opportunities
for protecting public transportation passengers and employees, but also pose new
risks and challenges.
Recent national and international events, such as the devastation left by
hurricane Katrina, the advance of avian flu, new threats to homeland security,
and the dramatic increase in local support for new investments in public
transportation are altering the institutional and policy framework for transit
safety and security in unprecedented ways.
FTA is continually looking for ways that it can support the efforts of the
rail transit industry to improve rail transit safety and security, from the
preliminary engineering phase through to operations and the decommissioning of
vehicles and equipment. Mr. Taborn emphasized that meetings, such as the 11th
Annual SSO
Program Meeting, provide a forum for SSO
agencies, rail transit agencies, and other industry stakeholders to communicate
their thoughts and ideas to FTA and the rest of the
SSO Community. Mr. Taborn urged the attendees to participate in each
session.
Mr. Taborn reiterated that FTA is committed to the future of rail safety and
security through all means available: regulation, policy, training, partnership,
and technical assistance. He concluded his welcoming remarks by thanking
everyone for their continued support in working with FTA to make the
SSO program strong and effective.
Mr. Taborn then introduced Mr. Mokhtee Ahmad, Regional Administrator for FTA's
Region 7.
Mokhtee Ahmad, FTA Regional Administrator, Region 7
Mr. Ahmad welcomed everyone to Minneapolis on behalf of FTA's Administrator,
Mr. Jim Simpson, FTA's Deputy Administrator, Ms. Sherry Little, and FTA's
Associate Administrator for Program Management, Ms. Susan Schruth. Mr. Ahmad
also explained that he was here on behalf of Ms. Marisol Simon, FTA's Regional
Administrator for Region 5, which includes Minnesota. Because of previous
obligations, Ms. Simon was unable to attend the 11th Annual
SSO
Program Meeting in person.
Mr. Ahmad stated that he joined
FTA in 1998, as the Regional Administrator for Region VII, which includes
Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas. FTA's Region VII Office is based in Kansas
City, Missouri. Mr. Ahmad noted that over the last decade, he has watched the
SSO program grow from its infancy to its current size, where 26
SSO agencies have been designated for 43 rail transit agencies, and
several more States and rail transit agencies will join the program by 2010.
As a Regional Administrator, Mr. Ahmad noted that he provides leadership to
the Regional Office in the administration of FTA's programs and the management
of Federal financial assistance within the terms of the FTA Act, other Federal
statutes, and regional plans. Mr. Ahmad also supports headquarters initiatives
to meet goals established for FTA by the U.S. Department of Transportation and
the FTA Administrator.
Mr. Ahmad noted that over the last few years, he has worked closely with Ms.
Schruth, Mr. Taborn, and Mr. McElveen to identify, oversee, and achieve safety,
security and emergency preparedness goals for the transit industry. Mr. Ahmad
noted that he has a special interest in safety issues from his early career at
the Kansas Department of Transportation, where he initiated and collaborated on
the department's annual publications of selected statistics, including Age and
Alcohol Traffic Accidents and Accident Statistics.
Mr. Ahmad explained that FTA manages an Annual Performance Plan, which
specifies a number of different goals for the agency which must be met in each
Fiscal Year (FY). In
FY 2007, two goals were established related to
safety, security and emergency preparedness. In FY
2008, these two goals have been combined into one over-arching goal.
Mr. Ahmad explained that it has been his pleasure to work with Ms. Schruth,
Mr. Taborn, and Mr. McElveen on these goals and their supporting programs. So
far, Mr. Ahmad reported that FTA has completed all required activities to meet
its FY
2007 safety, security, and emergency preparedness goals, and is well underway to
establish its work program for meeting the FY
2008 goal.
Mr. Ahmad urged the participants at the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting to continue
their candid dialogue with FTA regarding ways in which in the
SSO program can be strengthened. Mr. Ahmad noted that with the
reauthorization of SAFETEA-LU being less than two years away, it is an ideal
opportunity to raise issues that should be addressed in the next transportation
authorization bill. Mr. Ahmad concluded his welcoming remarks by wishing the
participants a great meeting.
Brian Lamb, Metro Transit General Manager
Mr. McElveen then introduced Metro Transit General Manager Brian J.
Lamb.
Mr. Lamb stated that Metro Transit was very pleased to be co-hosting the 11th
Annual
SSO Program Meeting, and to have an
opportunity to showcase both the Twin Cities and the Hiawatha Light Rail line.
Mr. Lamb began his comments by explaining that he was a little nervous to be
speaking in front of the nation's rail transit safety directors and
SSO program managers this Monday
morning, because on Sunday afternoon at about 4:00pm, an elderly driver of a van
took a U-turn in front of a Hiawatha Light Rail train, causing a collision.
While the elderly driver was not seriously injured and no one on the train was
hurt, the accident did shut down light rail service for about an hour on a part
of the system. Mr. Lamb joked that when he was informed of the accident, the
first thing he thought of was that attendees of the 11th Annual
SSO
Program Meeting may have been on the train, and would have a stack of detailed
reports waiting for him regarding how Metro Transit managed the accident.
Mr. Lamb then asked the participants, in a show of hands, to indicate who had
been to Minneapolis-St. Paul before. Most of the group had never been to the
Twin Cities.
Mr. Lamb provided an overview of a few places of interest, including the
shops and restaurants along the Nicollet Mall, the Minneapolis Institute of
Arts, the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome and the Vikings Stadium. Mr. Lamb also
pointed out that the Minnesota Wild, an expansion hockey team, play at the Xcel
Energy Center. Mr. Lamb noted that the Republican National Convention will take
place at the Xcel Energy Center in early September of next year.
Mr. Lamb cited the importance of gatherings such as the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting to foster
relationships between local, State, and Federal levels of government to promote
safety, security, and emergency preparedness. Mr. Lamb explained that he has a
close working relationship with his SSO
agency, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS). He thanked Kent O'Grady
and
DPS for everything that they
accomplished in working with Metro Transit to ensure a compliant safety program
for the Hiawatha Light Rail line when the system opened in 2004.
Mr. Lamb explained that when emergencies happen, such as the recent collapse
of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi, these relationships and shared
commitments can make all of the difference. Mr. Lamb noted that, in close
coordination with FTA and
U.S. DOT ,
within days after the bridge collapse, Metro Transit was able to obtain a $5
million grant to support the provision of additional transit service to reduce
congestion. Mr. Lamb went on to report that since the collapse, Metro Transit
has posted the highest ridership in its history.
Mr. Lamb also identified the ways in which the region's interoperable radio
system helped to support effective response. Since Metro Transit was in constant
communication with local law enforcement, Minnesota
DPS, and other responders, Metro Transit was able to dispatch buses
within 15 minutes to transport emergency responders from designated staging
areas to specified deployment locations near the river. Metro Transit also was
able to re-route its service, and within just a few hours, provide alternate
routes to passengers.
Mr. Lamb observed that most Americans take safety for granted. They expect
their bridges and roadways, their transit systems, their food, and their toys to
be well-designed and free from any threats to their well-being. Americans do not
always appreciate what is required to ensure their safety, and they quickly
become outraged when their safety is jeopardized. In our society, it is
incumbent upon all of us to ensure that we meet all safety standards, and that
we maintain constant vigilance in our efforts to provide services and products
to the public.
Mr. Lamb then provided a brief overview of Metro Transit's operations. Metro
Transit has a fleet of over 820 buses, providing approximately 120 bus routes
throughout Minneapolis and St. Paul. Metro Transit is making great gains in
reducing fuel emissions by using hybrid buses, next-generation fuels like
biodiesel and ultra-low sulfur diesel, and clean diesel technologies. Metro
Transit provides approximately 220,000 daily trips on its bus system.
Since 2004, Metro Transit has also operated the Hiawatha Light Rail Line,
which links downtown Minneapolis with Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport
and the Mall of America. It spans 12 miles and serves 17 stations. Ridership on
the line has greatly exceeded exceptions, and has already surpassed the
pre-construction estimate for the year 2020. Each day, approximately 30,000
people use the Hiawatha Light Rail system to reach their destinations.
Mr. Lamb noted that Metro Transit is now building its first commuter rail
system, the Northstar line. This system will run from the Big Lake area to
downtown Minneapolis along Highway 10, and will provide more than 5,000 daily
trips. Metro Transit is also investigating expansion options to connect downtown
Minneapolis and downtown St. Paul using light rail and bus rapid transit.
Metro Transit, like all transit agencies, is committed to safe and secure
operations. Mr. Lamb pointed out that a General Manager's job is challenging,
and many different options must be weighed in making decisions. Mr. Lamb stated
that while he cannot always give the Metro Transit Safety Department everything
it asks for, the on-going dialogue with his Safety Department and the Minnesota
DPS is a critical part of his
job. Whenever possible, he works with the Metro Transit Safety Department and
Minnesota
DPS to address issues
proactively and effectively. Mr. Lamb concluded his welcoming remarks by wishing
everyone a successful meeting.
Assistant Commissioner Tim Leslie, Minnesota Department of Public
Safety
Mr. McElveen next introduced Lt. Tim Rogotzke, the
SSO Program Manager for Minnesota
DPS. Lt. Rogotzke then
introduced Assistant Commissioner Tim Leslie from Minnesota
DPS. Assistant
Commissioner Leslie welcomed the participants at the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting to Minneapolis.
He thanked Lt. Rogotzke for introducing him, and for his hard work in taking
over from Kent O'Grady in managing the SSO
program for the State of Minnesota.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie also noted that since the State Police fall
within Minnesota DPS, the
agency has a tremendous amount of experience with traffic safety and accident
investigation, and a vested interest in mitigating those situations which lead
to unsafe behavior on the State's roadways and transit systems.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie clarified that though the Twin Cities may
appear as one city to the rest of the nation, here is Minnesota, the river
dividing the two cities is very important. Assistant Commissioner Leslie
explained how he grew up in Minneapolis and then spent the first part of his
career working in law enforcement in St. Paul. He noted that there are
significant differences between the two cities and their residents, and that
these differences are the source of wide-spread humor in the region.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie observed that though there are challenges in
uniting a varied region and getting people to work together, overall the region
shares a strong commitment to safety and emergency preparedness. Assistant
Commissioner Leslie commended the FTA, the
SSO agencies, and the rail transit
agencies for making a point of getting together and knowing each other well in
advance of an actual accident or emergency. Assistant Commissioner Leslie
pointed out that an emergency is not the time to be exchanging business cards.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie clarified that Minnesota
DPS and Metro Transit are
united in their mission to respond well and effectively when things go wrong.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie noted that no one wants to be criticized for a
delay in providing needed resources to support victims and their families. While
it sometimes is a thankless job, there are rewards in knowing that you and your
agency have done the best you can to help people during the most difficult of
situations.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie then described the response to the I-35W bridge
collapse on August 1, 2007. The bridge over the Mississippi collapsed during
rush hour, plunging dozens of cars and their occupants into the river. The
calamity disrupted transportation, aimed a spotlight on public infrastructure,
and evoked an outpouring of public response.
In addition to the heroic stories of the victims on the bridge working to
help each other, Assistant Commissioner Leslie pointed out that the public
service agencies, including Metro Transit, responded incredibly well and
cooperatively. Because the region has an excellent interoperable communications
system, all of the involved responders could talk to each other and respond
quickly to changing needs and conditions. Also, as a result of extensive
regional emergency planning and frequent drills and exercises, the responders
knew each other and the respective capabilities of each other's agencies.
Activities that may take many hours in some places were accomplished in minutes
during the bridge response.
Assistant Commissioner Leslie also described how Minnesota
DPS and Metro Transit are
working together to plan for the 2008 Republican National Convention. The Twin
Cities are proud to have been selected to host such an important event.
However, even one year out, there is a tremendous amount of work required to
ensure a successful event. Assistant Commissioner Leslie noted that, once again,
Minnesota DPS, other public
safety agencies, and Metro Transit are in the difficult position of working to
ensure that nothing goes wrong. Assistant Commissioner Leslie explained that
though their activities may be taken for granted during the actual Convention,
it is critical to go through the planning phase to ensure the safety and
security of all attendees and the eventual Republican Presidential nominee.
In conclusion, Assistant Commissioner Leslie commended the assembled group
for their commitment to transportation safety and security. He noted that
through the
SSO program, State agencies could
work cooperatively and effectively with their rail transit agencies to prevent
accidents, to investigate accidents and do occur, to develop corrective actions
to prevent recurrence, and to ensure the protection of rail transit passengers
and employees.
2. STATUS OF SSO AUDIT
PROGRAM AND FINDINGS
Following the welcoming remarks, Mr. Jim Caton and Mr. Andy Lofton, FTA
SSO program contractors, delivered
the meeting's first presentation. Their presentation, entitled "SSO
Audit Program 2007," provided an update on FTA's
SSO audit program and a summary of
key findings identified through the program during 2007. They began by
describing the audit process, walking the participants through a typical audit
timeline as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Audit Timeline
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton reviewed the materials that must be submitted
electronically by each SSO agency 4
weeks prior to the audit. These materials include copies of the
SSO agency's Program Standard and
supporting procedures, and copies of critical materials for each rail transit
agency in the
SSO agency's jurisdiction, including
the following:
- System Safety Program Plans (SSPPs),
- System Security Plans (SSPs),
- Completed SSPP and
SSP review checklists,
- Current internal safety and security audit program schedules for the
rail transit agencies and annual reports from the previous three years,
- Three-Year Safety and Security Review final reports,
- Hazard resolution tracking logs,
- The three most recent accident investigation reports for each rail
transit agency, including corrective action plans, and
- The corrective action plan tracking log being used by the
SSO agency.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained that these materials are used by the audit
team to familiarize themselves with how the
SSO agency and rail transit agency are implementing 49
CFR Part 659 requirements. The
audit team also uses these materials to populate audit checklists, maximizing
verification efforts prior to the onsite records review, and facilitating
finalization of audit schedules by prioritizing
SSO program areas. Finally, these materials are used to develop and
document pre-audit concerns and to refine questions and establish verification
points for the onsite reviews and interviews.
Each audit takes approximately 3 to 4 days to complete on-site and is
performed by a 3 to 4 person audit team. Audit attendees usually include the
SSO agency Program Manager, the
SSO agency contractor (if
applicable), and safety and security department representatives from the rail
transit agency.
Unlike in the past, where the SSO
audits took place at the SSO agency
headquarters, in 2007, most of the SSO
audits have been conducted at a rail transit agency in the
SSO agency's jurisdiction. This
change provides FTA's
SSO audit team with the chance to
review records at the rail transit agency and, if appropriate, to observe
specific functions, activities, or concerns that are being managed through the
SSO program.
Each audit begins with an entrance briefing that is used to set the agenda
for the audit and to explain the activities that will be performed. Interviews
are conducted onsite using an audit checklist. Oversight processes and
implementation issues are discussed, and feedback is solicited from audit
participants.
The audit team also performs records reviews to verify program
implementation, and SSO agency and
rail transit agency documentation. As appropriate, an on-site tour or
examination may be included as part of the
SSO audit. Once the audit is complete, the audit team holds an exit
briefing with the
SSO and rail transit agency
representatives to present preliminary findings and recommendations.
In making findings, Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained that FTA has developed
criteria to identify those instances where an element of a State's safety
oversight program is determined to be either in "Non-Compliance" or in
"Compliance with Recommendation."
- Non-Compliance - FTA determines that a required
component of an oversight agency's and rail transit agency's program does
not meet Part 659 requirements.
- Compliance with Recommendation - FTA determines that a
component of an oversight agency's and rail transit agency's program
technically meets the requirement of Part 659, but can be improved to meet
the intent of Part 659 or support more effective implementation.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained how FTA's audit team makes these findings.
As specified in the revised 49
CFR Part 659, there is a
listing of approximately 250 distinct activities that the
SSO program administered by the
State must perform. If the SSO
program is not performing one of these activities, a finding of "non-compliance"
is made. If a State is performing the activity, but the audit team has
identified opportunities for improvement based on outstanding recommendations to
FTA from
NTSB or the GAO
related to this activity, then a "compliance with recommendation" finding is
made. All other activities found to be in compliance are classified as
"compliant" and no findings are made.
FTA also uses the audit process as an opportunity to identify effective
practices. These practices are referenced by the
SSO audit team during the exit briefing. Finally, if additional technical
assistance is provided during the audit, this assistance is also noted during
the exit briefing.
Once the audit has been completed, a Final Audit Report is developed to
present audit activities and findings. The final report is typically delivered
within 2 weeks of the audit. FTA requires that the
SSO agency address all findings of "non-compliance" within 60 days.
FTA includes, as part of its Final Audit Report, an Audit Findings
Tracking Matrix, which contains all of the findings and provides columns for the
SSO agency to describe its proposed
corrective actions. FTA uses this matrix to work with the
SSO agency to track all findings to closure.
When completing its responses to the audit report, the
SSO agency is required to address
all findings of "non-compliance." FTA also encourages each
SSO agency to address each finding of "compliance with recommendation."
However, in the event the
SSO agency determines not to address
these findings, then FTA does require that the agency provides its rationale for
not addressing the "compliance with recommendation" finding.
FTA then tracks all audit findings and resolution efforts, sending out
monthly reminders if findings are not closed within the 60 day period. In
certain instances, depending on the nature of the finding, the
SSO agency may require several months to complete the corrective action.
In these cases, FTA may require bi-monthly or even quarterly updates rather than
monthly updates.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton then explained that all data gathered through the
audit is logged into FTA's
SSO Audit Program Database to
support program assessment and tracking of findings across the industry. FTA
also uses this information to support its management of the
SSO
program and to update the Rail Transit Safety Action Plan.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton next summarized the audit program findings
identified during the current audit cycle, which included audits performed on
the
SSO Programs of the Tennessee
DOT , Missouri
DOT , St. Clair County,
California
PUC , Florida
DOT , Arkansas
HTD , Michigan
DOT , Louisiana
DOTD , and
Texas DOT . Figure 2
summarizes the number of non-compliance and compliance with recommendation
findings generated during the current audit cycle.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton further clarified the findings of non-compliance
identified through the 2007 SSO
Program Audit cycle. The most common findings involved situations where:
SSO agencies had approved SSPPs
that did not address specific provisions contained within the
SSO agency's Program Standard or
specific provisions within 49 CFR
Part 659;
- SSO agencies had not
approved or adopted accident investigation procedures used by rail transit
agencies or by their own personnel;
- SSO agencies had not
developed, approved or adopted accident investigation reports from the rail
transit agencies in their jurisdiction;
- SSO agencies had not
implemented mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of corrective
action plans;
- SSO and rail transit
agencies were not implementing their hazard management processes as
documented in the Program Standard and SSPPs; and
- SSO agencies failed to have
mechanisms to assure ongoing reporting of hazards resolution activities by
the rail transit agencies.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton next reviewed the finding classifications used by
FTA to track and close-out findings. These classifications are defined as
follows:
- Closed - SSO
agency has implemented the recommended actions and provided FTA with
requested verification materials.
- Open Acceptable Action -
SSO agency has begun
implementing recommended action or proposed alternative action acceptable to
FTA and has provided a projected completion date that is also acceptable to
FTA.
- Open Unacceptable Action -
SSO agency has not begun to
implement the recommended corrective action and has not proposed an
acceptable alternative action, it has not provided a projected completion
date for addressing the finding, and/or the
SSO agency has not responded to FTA findings.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton stated that, to date, only one (1)
SSO agency has closed all of its
audit findings. Sixty-eight (68) percent of all audit findings identified
through the 2007 SSO Program Audit
cycle have not been closed. Forty (40) percent of the agencies audited in 2007
have failed to meet submission deadlines. In addition, 30% of these agencies
have failed to submit the Audit Findings Tracking Matrix on a consistent basis.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton also provided examples of acceptable and
unacceptable reasons for the SSO
agency to delay resolution of audit findings. Acceptable reasons for delay
included revisions to codes or standards that could not be expedited because
they required approvals of State legislative bodies or extensive legal reviews,
or the
SSO agency's inability of verify
implementation of corrective action until a specific event occurred, such as an
accident, submittal of an annual report, or an annual certification.
Unacceptable reasons for delay include non-responsiveness, and delays in
revisions without clearly identifying action plans and milestone dates.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton then explained how FTA tracks and manages those
situations where SSO agencies fail
to close out findings. FTA first sends routine emails requesting updates on the
status of required materials. In the event of non-responsiveness, Mr. Caton and
Mr. Lofton explained that FTA will first issue a letter to the
SSO Program Manager's direct supervisor(s) asking for additional support
in getting the findings closed. FTA may also coordinate with its Regional
Offices and review capital project funding to get a letter issued directly to
the rail transit agency.
Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton concluded their presentation by emphasizing the need
for continued compliance with FTA's
SSO Audit Program and FTA's desire
to continue its partnership with the SSO
community. Through this program, FTA hopes to increase the quality of safety and
security program implementation, to collect effective practices that can be
shared with industry, and to provide technical assistance when possible.
Comments and Discussion
Following this presentation, representatives from several of the audited
SSO agencies and their rail transit
agencies were asked to discuss their audit experiences. The following issues
were raised:
- Cost and Burden of
FTA Audit: SSO
and rail transit agencies found the costs associated with an FTA audit,
including the costs of compiling the requested audit materials and the costs
of
SSO personnel/contractor support
for the audit, to be burdensome. States suggested that FTA collect
information on these costs, so they would have a realistic assessment of the
impact of the audits, and how much time they take away from
SSO agency and rail transit
agency efforts to address actual safety issues in their programs. FTA
responded that it appreciates the burden associated with its audits.
However, FTA expects that
SSO agencies should have the
documentation requested by FTA readily available as part of their day-to-day
management of their program. Also, FTA hopes that the benefits of the
audits, including the identification and resolution of deficient elements in
the State's SSO program,
ultimately outweigh the costs and burdens associated with the audit.
- FTA Audit Schedule:
The SSO agencies and rail
transit agencies liked having FTA's
FY 2007 audit schedule emailed to them in
October of 2006. However, members of the
SSO
community noted that FTA made changes to this schedule and did not email an
updated version out to the community.
SSO and rail transit agencies requested that FTA's
FY 2008 Audit Program Schedule be emailed
out as soon as possible, and that as the schedule is revised, FTA email out
updated versions, so that States and rail transit agencies can budget
resources in advance of the actual audits.
- "Compliance with Recommendation" Finding Category:
There was extensive discussion regarding the "compliance with
recommendation" finding category and why FTA would issue findings it did not
have the authority to enforce. Several rail transit agencies considered this
practice, on the part of FTA, to be a bad auditing practice. FTA explained
that both NTSB and
GAO have made open recommendations to FTA regarding issues such as resources
devoted by the States to the
SSO program, training made
available to SSO and rail
transit safety personnel, and the safety reporting relationships in the rail
transit agency. FTA can only address these open recommendations by making
"compliance with recommendation" findings to the
SSO agency. However, FTA appreciates the validity of the industry's
concerns regarding FTA's "compliance with recommendation" findings from an
auditing perspective.
- Opportunity to Comment on FTA Final Audit Report:
Several representatives from both SSO
agencies and rail transit agencies felt that FTA's Final Audit Reports
should be delivered, first, in draft form, to enable the
SSO agencies and rail transit
agencies to provide comments, and potentially to address some of the
findings before they actually appear in the report.
SSO
personnel noted that, in its guidance materials, FTA encourages
SSO agencies to deliver their
Three-Year Safety Reviews in draft to the rail transit agencies to receive
comments. These representatives asked why FTA does not follow its own
recommended practice. In response, FTA noted that during the Exit Briefing,
FTA provides a viewgraph presentation with its findings and allows
opportunity for discussion and comment. FTA views this presentation as a
draft report.
FTA also noted that in response to these presentations, findings have
been changed or reworded. However, FTA representatives agreed that they
would review the current approach, and determine if perhaps these reports
should be issued in draft to provide the opportunity for additional comments
from SSO and rail transit agency
personnel.
- Need for Additional
FTA Outreach with Executives in State Agencies:
SSO personnel felt that FTA's
audit process, while basically sound, did not reach high enough within their
organizations. By conducting the audits at the rail transit agencies, and by
focusing on the immediate supervisors rather than executive directors, these
representatives felt that FTA did not take advantage of the opportunity to
meet with SSO
agency executive directors and to encourage support for the program.
SSO personnel believe that FTA
can provide valuable assistance to them in raising the profile of their
programs within their own agencies. SSO
personnel urged FTA to use its authority to "market" the
SSO program with Executive Directors in the States. FTA responded
that it would work to identify ways to reach out to executive leadership in
State DOTs and other State agencies with responsibility for the
SSO program. For example, FTA is
developing a "Dear Colleague" letter from the FTA Administrator to the
Governor of each State and the Executive Directors of each
SSO agency to explain FTA's new
SSO Program Managers Training
Curriculum and to solicit their support.
- Discretion of States with Limited Resources: SSO
personnel at a few States felt that FTA should give the States more leeway
to focus on specific issues that States felt were important, even if it
meant focusing less attention on specific provisions with 49
CFR Part 659. For example, if a rail transit agency had an extension
coming on-line, the State should be able to use its limited resources to
oversee the extension, and not to focus on specific Part 659 issues that
were less pressing. FTA responded by stating that 49
CFR Part 659 provisions have been established as minimum requirements
and cannot be waived based on situational concerns at a given rail transit
agency.
- States with Authority Exceeding 49
CFR Part 659:
Also, during this question-andanswer session, there was considerable
discussion in response to a question from a rail transit agency
representative from California regarding specific findings from a Three-Year
Safety Review that had just been conducted at his property. These findings
were made to address additional authority that the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) has to enforce standards regarding overhead
electrification systems for light rail. This representative asked if FTA
believed that findings related to additional authorities that
SSO agencies have, above and
beyond 49 CFR Part 659,
should be included in the Three-Year Safety Review Final Report. FTA
explained that this decision was at the discretion of the
SSO
agency. FTA also clarified that during its
SSO audits, FTA's audit team does not evaluate State implementation
of requirements developed to address authorities that exceed 49
CFR Part 659.
3. HAZARD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CLARIFICATION LETTER
Ms. Annabelle Boyd,
FTA
SSO program contractor, gave a
presentation on the September 6, 2007 clarification letter issued by FTA on the
hazard management program requirements specified in 49
CFR
Part 659. Ms. Boyd explained that participants at the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting should have
received FTA's September 6, 2007 clarification letter via email and that it was
in hard copy as part of their hand-outs for this meeting.
Ms. Boyd noted that FTA prepared this letter in response to questions
received from
SSO agencies and rail transit
agencies regarding how the hazard management program, specified in the revised
49
CFR Part 659, should be
developed, documented, administered, and monitored. Ms. Boyd explained that this
letter provides background regarding why FTA developed these new requirements in
the revised Part 659; a detailed explanation of these requirements, including
direct references to the applicable 49
CFR Part 659 provisions; and
examples of effective practices used by SSO
agencies and rail transit agencies to implement these provisions in their
respective programs.
Ms. Boyd reminded participants that Section 659.39 of FTA's original rule
required
SSO agencies to get involved in the
rail transit agency's hazard management program primarily during the
identification, investigation and resolution of accidents and "unacceptable
hazardous conditions." During public notice and comment undertaken for the Part
659 rule revision, both
SSO agencies and rail transit
agencies expressed their frustration with this approach. Both complained about
the subjectivity inherent in defining an "unacceptable hazardous condition."
SSO agencies also noted that,
because of this subjectivity, occasionally, these investigations became
unnecessarily adversarial.
SSO agencies also complained that
they had no authority to require on-going reporting regarding the rail transit
agency's hazard management program.
As FTA explained in the preamble to the revised rule, FTA changed the hazard
management program requirements to resolve these issues. Through these new
requirements, FTA intended for the SSO agencies to actively monitor the rail
transit agency's performance of the hazard management program in an ongoing
manner. SSO agencies would no longer become involved in this program only after
an accident or an "unacceptable hazardous condition" had been identified.
Further, by removing the vast majority of minor accidents and single-person
injuries from SSO
accident reporting thresholds, FTA responded to recommendations from rail
transit agencies that these minor occurrences would be more effectively
addressed through the hazard management program.
FTA intended for this new approach to be a "win-win" for all involved
parties. Rail transit agencies could document and manage minor incidents, such
as slips, trips, and falls and other single-person injuries, through the hazard
management program with less administrative burden.
SSO agencies would receive on-going
updates regarding the status of rail transit agency activities to address these
minor incidents and other concerns through the hazard management program. Should
a rail transit agency identify an "unacceptable hazardous condition," then the
SSO agency would be much better
prepared to support an investigation.
Ms. Boyd next reviewed each of the sections of Part 659 that establish the
hazard management program requirements. Ms. Boyd began with the revised section
659.15 (b)(8), which requires the SSO
agencies, in their Program Standards, to identify their requirements for
"ongoing communication and coordination relating to the identification,
categorization, resolution, and reporting of hazards to the oversight agency."
Ms. Boyd explained that this provision gives each
SSO agency the authority to require
ongoing reporting from each rail transit agency in its jurisdiction regarding
the performance of its hazard management program. This section also provides
SSO agencies with the authority to
require notification and investigation reports or other information regarding
the identification of specific types or categories of hazards at the rail
transit agency.
Ms. Boyd then addressed Part 659.19 (f), which defines minimum requirements
for what must be contained in the rail transit agency's hazard management
program. In § 659.19 (f), FTA authorizes each
SSO agency to require each rail transit agency to include in its System
Safety Program Plan (SSPP) "a description of the rail transit agency's process
used to implement its hazard management program, including activities for:
- (1) Hazard identification;
- (2) Hazard investigation, evaluation and analysis;
- (3) Hazard control and elimination;
- (4) Hazard tracking; and
- (5) Requirements for on-going reporting to the oversight agency relating
to hazard management activities and status."
Section 659.19 (f) requires that each
SSPP contain a section that
addresses each of the five items specified in § 659.19 (f). Ms. Boyd explained,
that in meeting the fifth item specified in § 659.19 (f), FTA expects that each
rail transit agency will include a description of how it will provide ongoing
reporting to the
SSO agency regarding the activities
performed in the hazard management program and the status of findings and hazard
mitigation activities. Ms. Boyd also noted that this description should conform
to any requirements specified by the SSO
agency in its Program Standard to address 49
CFR 659.15 (b)(8).
Ms. Boyd then explained that Section 659.31 provides additional clarification
regarding the authority conferred to each
SSO
agency to require each rail transit agency in its jurisdiction to develop,
implement, and document, in its SSPP
, a program to identify and resolve hazards. Ms. Boyd pointed out that Section
659.31 (a) states that this program must include "any hazards resulting from
subsequent system extensions or modifications, operational changes, or other
changes within the rail transit environment."
Ms. Boyd also noted that Section 659.31 (b) requires that the hazard
management program implemented by the rail transit agency "must, at a minimum:
- (1) Define the rail transit agency's approach to hazard management and
the implementation of an integrated system-wide hazard resolution process;
- (2) Specify the sources of, and the mechanisms to support, the on-going
identification of hazards within the rail transit agency;
- (3) Define the process by which identified hazards will be evaluated and
prioritized for elimination or control by the rail transit agency;
- (4) Identify the mechanism used by the rail transit agency to track,
through resolution, the identified hazard(s);
- (5) Define the rail transit agency's minimum thresholds for the
notification and reporting of hazard(s) to state oversight agencies; and
- (6) Specify the process by which the rail transit agency will provide
on-going reporting of hazard resolution activities to the state oversight
agency."
Ms. Boyd further explained that Section 659.31 provides each
SSO agency with the authority to
require each rail transit agency to document, in its
SSPP or supporting procedures,
the following:
- The rail transit agency's overall approach to implementing an
integrated, system-wide hazard resolution process (i.e., not only to address
operational hazards, but also hazards from system extensions/modification,
operational changes, or other changes within the rail transit environment);
- Sources and mechanisms used by the rail transit agency to identify
hazards (i.e., customer complaints, employee reports, review of near-miss
incidents and control center logs, analysis of maintenance records, accident
investigations, formal hazard analysis, etc.);
- Processes used by the rail transit agency to evaluate and prioritize
hazards (i.e., formal hazard analysis, informal assessment based on
experience and technical recommendations, trending analysis, consultant
reviews, manufacturer's recommendations, etc.);
- Tracking systems used by the rail transit agency to record the results
of these analyses and the status of identified mitigation activities (i.e.,
information management systems, databases, paper records, committee meeting
minutes, etc.);
- Thresholds, specified by the SSO
agency in its Program Standard, which if triggered, require the rail transit
agency to notify the SSO agency,
within a time-frame specified by the
SSO
agency in its Program Standard;
- Any required investigation reports or other documents to be provided by
the rail transit agency to the SSO
agency, as specified in the SSO
agency's Program Standard, regarding any hazard that triggers the hazard
notification threshold; and
- The process to be used by the rail transit agency for reporting ongoing
hazard management program activities to the
SSO agency (i.e., monthly or
quarterly logs, monthly or quarterly meetings,
SSO
participation on RTA
Hazard Resolution Committees, etc.).
Ms. Boyd then addressed Sections 659.17 and 659.25 of the revised rule, which
confer the authority to each SSO
agency, through the annual SSPP
update, review, and approval process, to ensure that 49
CFR Part 659 hazard management
program requirements are adequately addressed in the rail transit agency's
SSPP . If the rail transit
agency's
SSPP does not comply with §
659.19 (f) and § 659.31 (a) and (b) requirements, or with the ongoing reporting
provisions specified in the SSO
agency's Program Standard to address section 659.15 (b)(8), then the
SSO agency may reject the
SSPP . This rejection would
occur through the same review and approval process the
SSO agency uses to ensure
SSPP conformance to other §
659.19 requirements and its Program Standard.
Ms. Boyd then provided some examples of ways in which
SSO agencies and rail transit
agencies have complied with these provisions. For example, Ms. Boyd noted that,
in Program Standards or procedures, SSO
agencies ensure "ongoing communication and coordination" regarding the rail
transit agency's implementation of the hazard management program by requesting
the following:
- Submission of a monthly or quarterly hazard tracking log maintained by
the rail transit agency;
- Direct access to web-based systems used by the rail transit agency to
report, manage, and track hazards or submission of weekly, monthly, or
quarterly reports from these systems;
- Monthly or quarterly submission of the actual reports collected by the
rail transit agency from various sources regarding reported hazards;
- Monthly or quarterly teleconferences or in-person meetings to discuss
the hazards identified by the rail transit agency and the activities being
taken to address them; or
- SSO agency participation on
the rail transit agency's Hazard Resolution Committee or other equivalent
committee or task force that meets regularly to discuss the rail transit
agency's implementation of its hazard management program.
Based on Initial Submissions made to FTA by May 1, 2006, and the results of
SSO Audits conducted over the last 15 months, Ms. Boyd explained that the
most common methods used to address these requirements include:
Monthly or quarterly hazard tracking logs provided by the rail transit
agency to the SSO agency; or
SSO agency participation in the
rail transit agency's Hazard Resolution Committee Meetings, or other equivalent
committee meetings, and receipt of all minutes, logs, and correspondence from
these committees.Ms. Boyd noted that a sample hazard tracking matrix is
located on Page 58 in Chapter 9 of FTA's Implementation Guidelines for 49
CFR
Part 659. Detailed recommendations for requiring a hazard management
program that complies with 49 CFR
Part 659 provisions are included in Section 6 - Hazard Management Process of
Appendix E: Program Requirements for Development of a Rail Transit Agency
SSPP , located in FTA's Resource
Toolkit for State Oversight Agencies Implementing 49
CFR
Part 659.
4. IMPLEMENTING PART 659 HAZARD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Al Fazio, General Manager, New Jersey Transit, River
LINE, and Vice President, Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, facilitated this
session, which included four presenters from the rail transit industry, who
described their approaches to identifying, resolving, and tracking hazards.
During his introductory comments, Mr. Fazio explained that as a General
Manager, he considers an active focus on hazard management to be the best form
of "enlightened self interest." Though he acknowledges that other General
Managers may not be deeply invested in their agency's system safety programs,
Mr. Fazio stated that, for him, in this day and age of 24-hour media and complex
relationships with oversight agencies, he could not imagine a situation where he
could run his agency and not be actively involved in the implementation of the
hazard management program.
Mr. Fazio also explained that, while he is the General Manager of New Jersey
Transit River LINE, he is not an employee of New Jersey Transit. Mr. Fazio noted
that the operation and maintenance of the River LINE system is managed entirely
by Bombardier, under contract to New Jersey Transit. As more and more rail
transit service is being provided by contractors, Mr. Fazio explained that there
is a movement within the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) to
refer to rail transit agencies as "rail transit systems."
Mr. Fazio explained that while this change in terminology may seem
insignificant, it is actually quite important because it recognizes that
contractors, too, have accountability for critical functions, such as safety,
during rail transit operations and maintenance. Therefore, in the
APTA Rail
Transit Standards Program and other
APTA materials,
"rail transit system" will be used increasingly more often as a term of the
trade.
Mr. Fazio noted that one of the most challenging parts of his job is
distinguishing real risk from imaginary risk. For example, he explained that
most of River LINE's track runs through suburban areas where there are no
threats from overhead construction, and in many cases, no buildings located
adjacent to the tracks. River LINE operates Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs) so
there are no overhead catenary wires. Therefore, he was actively involved in a
hazard assessment which determined that River LINE's track workers did not need
to wear hardhats. These workers instead now wear ball caps, which are more
comfortable in the field and provide less distraction for workers who must bend
over and turn their heads as part of their jobs. By assessing real risk, instead
of imagined risks, River LINE was able to ensure safety and to avoid wasting its
limited resources enforcing requirements for unnecessary personal protective
equipment.
Mr. Fazio also noted that this focus on managing real risks has proved
invaluable in working with State and Federal oversight agencies and Conrail to
ensure River LINE's access to track on the general railroad system. Mr. Fazio
pointed out that River LINE's DMU
operate on 34 miles of single track with passing sidings from Camden to Trenton,
and a 1.5 mile street-running section of embedded track in Camden. Approximately
24 miles of this alignment is on the general railroad system.
River LINE provides service on this track under the terms of a temporal
separation waiver with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). To make this
work, River LINE uses a combination of advanced rail traffic control, automatic
train stop signaling, and temporal separation that yields maximum safety and
track availability for passengers and freight. River LINE's operations control
center also dispatches ConRail freight traffic at night, Sunday through Friday.
Because of FRA
oversight, Mr. Fazio explained that River LINE's operating rules are a Northeast
Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) derivative with additional rules in
place for light rail transit operations. However, since River LINE has been
waived from some
FRA requirements, River
LINE also falls under 49 CFR
Part 659, and participates in the SSO
program managed by New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT).
As a result, River LINE has to work with
FRA , FTA and
NJDOT to
continually demonstrate that running trains at 60 mph over single track with
tightly timed meets at sidings, under conditions of temporal separation with
freight traffic, is safe. Largely through River LINE's commitment to its program
for assessing and controlling hazards, Mr. Fazio noted that River LINE has been
able to work with
FRA ,
NJDOT , and Conrail
to extend River LINE's service hours and to ensure track access for special
events.
Mr. Fazio concluded his comments by stating that it is a very exciting time
to be providing light rail passenger service on the general railroad system.
Hazard management and appropriate risk identification and mitigation are
critical to the success of this service, and to continued dialogue with
FRA regarding the
possibility, one day, of truly intermingled freight and light rail service on
the general railroad system. Mr. Fazio urged anyone who was interested in these
topics to consider attending the 14th Railway Age Passenger Trains on Freight
Railroads Conference, October 22-23, 2007, in Washington D.C.
a. Internet Based Hazard Tracking Systems
Mr. Fazio then introduced the first speaker in the session, Mr. Henry
Hartberg, Senior Manager of Operations Safety, Dallas Area Rapid
Transit (DART).
Mr. Hartberg provided a description of
DART's automated approach to
identifying, assessing, managing, and tracking hazards. Mr. Hartberg noted that
DART uses a proprietary,
automated Workflow system to manage administrative tasks and that hazard
identification and reporting have been incorporated into this system.
Mr. Hartberg pointed out that DART's
Workflow system started in the late 1990s as a way to assign, track, and monitor
accounts payable items as they moved through the procurement process. However,
it quickly became apparent that this system, which enables users throughout the
agency to handle and follow-up on workflow actions easily, and which allows
supervisors and managers to monitor activities in real-time and to use graphical
reports, had wide-spread applicability for a range of
DART functions.
Mr. Hartberg explained that, in the beginning, the developers of this system
were widely soliciting additional functions and features. Mr. Hartberg met with
them and proposed that a hazard identification reporting function be included in
the system.
For this function, Mr. Hartberg identified some of the challenges he faced in
managing hazards that he believed could be addressed through an automated
system:
- Making reporting accessible to everyone, so anyone could log on to the
system and electronically file a hazard identification report;
- Enabling the forwarding of reported hazards to supervisors and managers
in departments with the authority to assess and resolve the reported hazard;
- Maintaining a transparent record of actions, so it was clear whether
action had been taken and what specifically had been done;
- Supporting the integration of the hazard management process at levels of
the agency, enabling supervisors and managers to communicate with the Bus
Safety Committee (BSC), Rail Safety Committee (RSC), and
DART Safety Committee (DSC)
regarding hazard reports, assessment and actions, and other activities; and
- Supporting retrieval of records to enhance follow-up, verification, and
close-out for hazards.
Further, Mr. Hartberg wanted to make sure that the person filing the hazard
report, his or her supervisor, and the
DART
Safety Department would receive automated emails notifying them of any new
activity performed to address the hazard.
Mr. Hartberg also wanted the system to ensure that the hazard identification
report was a simple form that the person reporting the hazard could quickly and
easily file. Once the hazard identification report was filed, Mr. Hartberg noted
that the DART Safety Department
would need to use the system to:
- Initiate or delegate requests for action;
- Monitor the status on-going requests;
- Send reminder emails and status update requests;
- Report on actions performed;
- Report on actions not performed;
- Provide real-time follow-up and alerts to the
BSC ,
RSC , and
DSC, as appropriate; and
- Ensure that, through the workflow, all involved individuals receive
emails advising them of: actions assigned to them, actions they are
requested to assign, requests that have been closed, actions overdue or
cancelled, and final close-out of the hazard.
Finally, Mr. Hartberg wanted the system to provide the ability, at any time,
to check the status of actions performed to address the reported hazard and to
provide reports, through scorecards or other features, tracking the time
required to close the hazard, the number and types of reported hazards, and the
individuals involved.
Mr. Hartberg noted that he was lucky to work with the system developers at
the beginning of the process, when DART
had not yet fully committed to the Workflow system. The hazard reporting
function was only the third or fourth workflow developed, and received a lot of
attention and care from the developers.
Now, DART's in-house,
web-based, automated task distribution program is greatly in demand, and the
developers are back-logged with dozens of requests for new workflows. However,
through the strong relationship Mr. Hartberg was able to build with the
developers, he was also able to get workflows for
DART's random drug testing program and periodic employee physical
program. To date, over 60 other workflows are used by
DART.
Mr. Hartberg then reviewed screenshots from the hazard reporting Workflow,
walking the participants of the 11th Annual
SSO
Program Meeting through the steps involved. Mr. Hartberg noted the following:
- A Hazard identification report will be submitted either through the
Hazard
ID Workflow or be submitted to the
DART Safety Department for
input into the Hazard ID Workflow.
- Rail and bus operators and maintenance personnel can enter hazards
directly into the system through kiosks located in their break rooms or
by asking their supervisors to file them on their behalf.
- Hazards from other sources, such as customer service complaints, or
as a result of internal safety audits, rule compliance programs, or
accidents or near misses, will be entered into the system by
DART Safety personnel.
- Once input, either by the initiators themselves or by
DART Safety personnel, the
Hazard
ID Workflow item will be forwarded to
the immediate supervisor who shall investigate the report and initiate a
resolution if possible.
- DART encourages the
resolution of hazards at the lowest level possible, and the
DART Safety Committee,
which is comprised of DART
senior management, actively follows up with managers and directors who
fail to take action.
- If a supervisor or manager is unable to resolve the hazard, then the
supervisor or manager shall forward the Hazard
ID form and his or her response to the appropriate Division,
Sub-Safety Committee or the DART
Bus Safety Committee (BSC), the DART
Rail Safety Committee (RSC), or DART
Safety Committee (DSC) for review and resolution.
- The decision on where best to forward the Hazard
ID will be based on the best judgment of
the supervisor/manager.
- The appropriate committee shall review the Hazard
ID and initiate a recommendation (if
necessary) for resolution whenever feasible.
- If the submitting employee is not satisfied with the response from the
supervisor or the RSC /
BSC level, the committee shall
forward the Hazard ID , along with all
recommendations and evaluations, to the
DSC for further consideration. The
DSC may either accept the recommendations as presented or may
initiate their own resolution to the hazard. The
DSC decision is final.
- All open Hazard ID forms will be
reviewed and updated at all pertinent safety committees on a monthly basis.
- When planning the resolution of an assessed hazard, the actions of the
resolving body are guided by DART's
hazard resolution guidelines.
- To verify that a proposed resolution has been implemented and has
achieved the desired results requires follow-up. Follow-up is the
responsibility of both the DSC
and the responsible departments using statistical analysis and audits as the
primary methods.
- To ensure the on-going role in the oversight of the rail transit
agency's hazard management process,
DART
provides a monthly hazard tracking log that is a function of the Hazard
ID Workflow and is organized by hazard
identification number. Open hazard I.D.s will be submitted to
DART's State Safety Oversight
Agency, TxDOT,
monthly through the safety committee minutes.
- TxDOT will
review the monthly hazard activity and forward any questions or requests for
information to the rail agency.
TxDOT
is sent the minutes of all safety committee meetings once each month after
the
DART Safety Committee has
taken place.
- In addition, DART will
conduct meetings with TxDOT
upon request and will maintain electronic contact on a regular basis.
- During application of the hazard management process, for any hazard
identified as an "unacceptable hazardous condition," the
DART Safety Department will
notify the TxDOT
designated point-of-contact within 24 hours by use of the "
TxDOT Notification
of a Reportable Accident/Incident, or Hazardous Condition" form. In
addition, the appropriate safety committee will conduct an investigation,
lead by the
DART Safety Department.
- At the conclusion of the investigation, the final investigation report
will be provided to TxDOT
for review and comment. Any corrective action plans developed as a result of
the investigation will be reviewed and approved by
TxDOT. The state
oversight agency retains the authority to request a status briefing on any
unacceptable hazardous condition investigation.
Mr. Hartberg pointed out that, using the system, supervisors and employees
can choose different actions from drop down menus, such as "Move to Safety
Action Required," which sends the form back to the Safety Department, "Close,"
"Reject," "Reassign," or "Provide Comments." The "Close" option is only a
suggestion to close and requires the Safety Department to review the form and
hazard log history before sending it through the Workflow process, which moves
the item directly to the
DSC for review. Once reviewed by the
Committee, the Safety Department can choose "Permanently Close This Item" from
the drop down menu, which provides final hazard closure. Any action or reporting
tied to the hazard log item is tracked and linked to the item through the "Event
History." This creates a complete file for the hazard report.
Mr. Hartberg also informed the participants at the 11th Annual
SSO Program Meeting that the
DART system is password protected
and that only Mr. Hartberg or his designated proxy has the ability to close an
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