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11th Annual State Safety Oversight Program Meeting Summary
United States Department of Transportation logo U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Transit
Administration
Meeting Summary
11th Annual State Safety
Oversight Program Meeting
  Minneapolis, Minnesota
Millennium Hotel
September 17 to 20, 2007

Introduction

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) held its 11th Annual State Safety Oversight Program Meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota - September 17 to 20, 2007. This meeting was co-hosted by the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and Metro Transit.

There were a total of 95 attendees at this year's meeting, including:

  • 26 representatives from 24 State safety oversight (SSO) agencies;
  • 42 representatives from 24 rail transit agencies;
  • 12 representatives from FTA partners, including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Operation Lifesaver, and universities participating in the University Transportation Center (UTC) program; and
  • 15 representatives from FTA, including FTA Headquarters, four FTA Regional Offices, and FTA support staff.

Appendix A of this Meeting Summary contains the Participant List. The Annual Meeting was facilitated by Mr. Levern McElveen, Safety Team Leader, FTA's Office of Safety and Security. During the three-and-a-half days, presentations were given by:

  • Mr. Henry Hartberg, Senior Manager of Operations Safety, Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART);
  • Mr. Craig Macdonald, Director of Risk Management, Claims, and Safety, St. Louis Metro;
  • Ms. Theresa Impastato, Safety Manager, New Jersey Transit, South New Jersey Light Rail, River LINE;
  • Mr. Nagal Shashidhara, Director of System Safety and Quality Assurance Program for Light Rail Operations at New Jersey Transit;
  • Ms. Violet Gunka, Illinois Regional Transit Authority;
  • Mr. Mike Flanigon, Director, Office of Technology, Federal Transit Administration;
  • Ms. Lisa Colbert, Office of Research, Innovation and Demonstration, Federal Transit Administration;
  • Ms. Isabel Kaldenbach, National Director, Light Rail Safety Education, Operation Lifesaver, Inc.;
  • Dr. Beverly Sauer, Professor of the Practice-Managerial Communication, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University;
  • Mr. Thomas Farmer, Deputy General Manager, Mass Transit, TSA ;
  • Mr. Peter Roe, Branch Chief, Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, TSA ;
  • Mr. Jerry Shook, State Safety Oversight Program Manager, New York Public Transportation Safety Board;
  • Mr. Ronald Keele, Executive Director, Office of Safety and Risk Management, Maryland Transit Administration;
  • Ms. Elayne Berry, Executive Director of Safety and Quality Assurance, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority; and
  • Mr. Joe Diaz, System Safety and Security Officer, Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority.

Sessions were also conducted by Mr. Michael Taborn, Director of FTA's Office of Safety and Security, Mr. Richard Wong, with FTA's Office of Chief Counsel, and Mr. Richard Gerhart, Security Team Leader with FTA's Office of Safety and Security, to address:

  • Current FTA initiatives, including coordination with TSA to implement new requirements in H.R. 1, Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission;
  • FTA's upcoming rule revision to address provisions in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), which affect Part 659's enabling legislation;
  • Proposed responses to recent recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation into the July 11, 2006 derailment at the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA);
  • FTA's technical clarification letter regarding the hazard management program requirements in Part 659; and
  • FTA's SSO Audit Program.

Presentations were also made by Ms. Annabelle Boyd, Mr. Jim Caton, and Mr. Andy Lofton, contractors for FTA's SSO Program, and by several UTC representatives, including:

  • Dr. Reinhardt Brown, Interim Executive Director, South Carolina State University, James E. Clyburn University Transportation Center;
  • Dr. Jill Hough, Director, North Dakota University, Small Urban & Rural Transit Center;
  • Dr. Mahmud Farooque, Center/Managing Director, NEXTRANS Purdue, Regional University Transportation Center; and
  • Dr. Max Donath, Director, University of Minnesota, Intelligent Transportation Systems Institute.

This year's annual meeting also included a break-out session focused on identifying and managing hazardous conditions. Separate training sessions were also provided for SSO personnel and rail transit agency representatives to address specific issues and initiatives relevant to their respective implementation of 49 CFR Part 659 requirements.

On Wednesday afternoon, September 19, 2007, Metro Transit provided a tour of its alignment, Operations Control Center, Vehicle Maintenance Facility, Traction Power Sub-Station, and gave a special presentation on its Track Worker Protection Program.

Appendix B provides a listing of the contents of the CD-ROM included with this Meeting Summary. This CD-ROM includes electronic copies of all viewgraph presentations, handouts, and other materials distributed during the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting.

Appendix C provides the results of the evaluations received from the participants of the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting, including recommendations for topics and issues to be addressed at future meetings.

ORGANIZATION OF MEETING SUMMARY

The Meeting Summary presents the topics covered at the meeting and highlights discussion points and identified action items. It is organized into the following sections:

  1. Welcoming Remarks
  2. Status of SSO Audit Program and Findings
  3. FTA's Hazard Management Program Clarification Letter
  4. Implementing FTA's Hazard Management Program Requirements
    1. Internet-Based Hazard Tracking Systems
    2. Identifying and Managing Hazards from the Internal Safety Audit Process
    3. Identifying and Managing Hazards during Operations
    4. Approaches for Evaluating Hazard in the Rail Transit Environment
    5. Hazard Management Team Building Exercises
  5. NTSB Investigation of the July 11, 2006 Derailment at the Chicago Transit Authority
    1. Findings and Recommendations from NTSB's September 11, 2007 Hearing
    2. CTA and Illinois RTA Post-Accident Activities
    3. Impacts on FTA's SSO Program
  6. University Transportation Center Research Programs
  7. Operation Lifesaver
  8. Partnering for Rail Transit Security Oversight
  9. Special Training Sessions
    1. SSO Agencies
    2. Rail Transit Agencies
    Tour of Metro Transit Light Rail System
  10. Safety Credentials
  11. Effective Practices in Accident Investigation

1.  WELCOMING REMARKS

Mr. Levern McElveen, Safety Team Leader for FTA's Office of Safety and Security, kicked the meeting off by welcoming participants to Minneapolis. Mr. McElveen explained that the agenda for the meeting had been developed through a working group comprised of SSO and rail transit agency representatives to include topics of interest to the SSO community. Mr. McElveen reviewed the agenda with the attendees, highlighting break-out sessions, the tour at Metro Transit, and the welcome reception on Monday night. Mr. McElveen then introduced Mr. Michael Taborn, Director, FTA's Office of Safety and Security.

Michael Taborn, Director, FTA's Office of Safety and Security

Mr. Taborn welcomed everyone to the annual meeting and stated that attendance was at an all alltimehigh. He commended the participants for their commitment to the SSO Program and extended a special thanks to the meeting's hosts, Deputy Commissioner Tim Leslie and Lt. Tim Rogotzke of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and Metro Transit's General Manager, Brian Lamb, along with Mike Conlon and John MacQueen from Metro Transit's Safety Department.

Mr. Taborn went on to state that FTA conducts an ambitious program of oversight and technical assistance activities designed to prevent public transportation fatalities, injuries, property damage and system interruption, and to ensure the capability to respond effectively to those accidents, security incidents, and emergencies that do occur. Mr. Taborn noted that FY 2007 saw FTA's greatest investment yet in supporting the safety, security and emergency preparedness of the public transportation industry, and its strongest delivery of programs, products, training, and services.

Specifically for the SSO Program, in FY 2007, FTA:

  • Updated its SSO Audit Program to address recent revisions to 49 CFR Part 659 and to enhance to assessment of the quality of Part 659 implementation.
  • Conducted nine audits of SSO agencies using the revised audit process, with a 10th audit in process. FTA is now on track to complete SSO audits of all oversight agencies by the end of FY 2009.
  • Updated TSI 's Rail System Safety Course to address Part 659 provisions, and provided three course offerings. Through TSI and NTI , FTA also provided over 200 offerings of other courses designed to enhance the safety, security, and emergency preparedness posture of the transit industry.
  • Conducted the 2nd Annual Invitational Training Workshop for SSO Program Managers in Tampa, FL to support the professional develop of SSO Program Managers and to enhance the quality of implementation of 49 CFR Part 659.
  • Invited a representative group of SSO Program Managers to attend the two Transit Safety and Security Roundtables offered in FY 2007. In the July Roundtable, FTA conducted two sessions devoted to track worker protection and maintenance oversight issues. FTA also facilitated a session with TSA regarding security issues in the rail transit industry that highlighted interaction with the SSO program.
  • Initiated an ambitious new training program for SSO Program Managers, including creation of a training curriculum and development of Individualized Training Plans (ITPs) for each SSO Program Manager to document how he or she will participate in the SSO Training Curriculum over the next three years.
  • Completed and released FTA Guidance Circular 5800.1, Safety and Security Management in Major Capital Projects. The guidance includes new requirements for ensuring that safety and security are addressed during all phases of the New Starts planning and development process.
  • Completed an extensive analysis of the rail transit industry's safety performance and developed FTA's 2007 Rail Transit Safety Action Plan, FTA's revised Top 10 Safety Action Priorities, and supporting technical assistance materials.
  • Obtained funding to support FTA's new Track Worker Protection and Maintenance Oversight program, designed to enhance the safety of track workers and achieve improvements in the safety oversight of critical maintenance functions.

Mr. Taborn next discussed the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hearing, which was held Tuesday, September 11, 2007, to adopt findings and recommendations from the NTSB's investigation of the July 11, 2006 derailment at the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). Mr. Taborn noted that, during this hearing, the Board declared, very publicly, its belief that the SSO program is not sufficiently overseeing rail transit safety. Mr. Taborn stated that the NTSB believes FTA should be requiring more and doing more to ensure rail transit safety on a day-today basis.

Mr. Taborn noted that FTA is committed to working with the NTSB, the nation's rail transit agencies, and the State safety oversight agencies to address the NTSB's recommendations and to determine ways in which the SSO program can be improved. Mr. Taborn also clarified that FTA is concerned that in the investigative process used to assign responsibility for this derailment, the NTSB did not appropriately identify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the involved parties as specified in 49 CFR Part 659. The SSO rule has been developed to bridge local, State, and Federal authorities and responsibilities for safety oversight of rail transit agencies, and there are inherent challenges that must be addressed every day in using this framework to identify and resolve safety issues.

Mr. Taborn explained that it is understandable, in light of the facts of the derailment at CTA, that the NTSB believes "someone" should have stepped in to do "something" to prevent the systemic degradation of CTA's track. However, it is important to recognize that corrective actions cannot be required, and rail transit agencies cannot be forced to address them, without appropriate delegations of authority.

In the coming months, Mr. Taborn explained that FTA will be working at all levels to review its enabling legislation to determine if there are ways that FTA can provide rail transit safety managers, SSO agencies, and FTA's own management of the SSO Program with additional authorities to require and enforce that actions be taken to identify and address safety deficiencies.

Mr. Taborn urged the attendees to take similar actions within their own agencies to identify opportunities for improvement in the management of their safety programs and the enforcement of safety authorities.

In addition, Mr. Taborn noted that FTA has established a new Fire Safety and Analysis Program in partnership with the National Association of State Fire Marshals to analyze industry data regarding public transportation fires and to develop recommendations for preventing and fighting fires in the public transportation environment. It is FTA's hope that the findings from this program will help to address NTSB recommendations regarding needed improvements in the management of "smoke in tunnel conditions" at rail transit agencies.

Mr. Taborn also stated that in FY 2008, FTA will be kicking off new initiatives to address track worker protection and maintenance oversight issues in the rail transit industry. Mr. Taborn noted that the safety, security, and emergency preparedness problems faced by the public transportation industry are far more complex than those of 30 years ago, and implementing solutions is therefore more challenging. Aging infrastructure and increasing demands for rail transit service have raised risks for track workers and passengers, and highlighted the need for additional safety oversight of critical maintenance functions. Emerging technologies offer new opportunities for protecting public transportation passengers and employees, but also pose new risks and challenges.

Recent national and international events, such as the devastation left by hurricane Katrina, the advance of avian flu, new threats to homeland security, and the dramatic increase in local support for new investments in public transportation are altering the institutional and policy framework for transit safety and security in unprecedented ways.

FTA is continually looking for ways that it can support the efforts of the rail transit industry to improve rail transit safety and security, from the preliminary engineering phase through to operations and the decommissioning of vehicles and equipment. Mr. Taborn emphasized that meetings, such as the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting, provide a forum for SSO agencies, rail transit agencies, and other industry stakeholders to communicate their thoughts and ideas to FTA and the rest of the SSO Community. Mr. Taborn urged the attendees to participate in each session.

Mr. Taborn reiterated that FTA is committed to the future of rail safety and security through all means available: regulation, policy, training, partnership, and technical assistance. He concluded his welcoming remarks by thanking everyone for their continued support in working with FTA to make the SSO program strong and effective. Mr. Taborn then introduced Mr. Mokhtee Ahmad, Regional Administrator for FTA's Region 7.

Mokhtee Ahmad, FTA Regional Administrator, Region 7

Mr. Ahmad welcomed everyone to Minneapolis on behalf of FTA's Administrator, Mr. Jim Simpson, FTA's Deputy Administrator, Ms. Sherry Little, and FTA's Associate Administrator for Program Management, Ms. Susan Schruth. Mr. Ahmad also explained that he was here on behalf of Ms. Marisol Simon, FTA's Regional Administrator for Region 5, which includes Minnesota. Because of previous obligations, Ms. Simon was unable to attend the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting in person.

Mr. Ahmad stated that he joined FTA in 1998, as the Regional Administrator for Region VII, which includes Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas. FTA's Region VII Office is based in Kansas City, Missouri. Mr. Ahmad noted that over the last decade, he has watched the SSO program grow from its infancy to its current size, where 26 SSO agencies have been designated for 43 rail transit agencies, and several more States and rail transit agencies will join the program by 2010.

As a Regional Administrator, Mr. Ahmad noted that he provides leadership to the Regional Office in the administration of FTA's programs and the management of Federal financial assistance within the terms of the FTA Act, other Federal statutes, and regional plans. Mr. Ahmad also supports headquarters initiatives to meet goals established for FTA by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the FTA Administrator.

Mr. Ahmad noted that over the last few years, he has worked closely with Ms. Schruth, Mr. Taborn, and Mr. McElveen to identify, oversee, and achieve safety, security and emergency preparedness goals for the transit industry. Mr. Ahmad noted that he has a special interest in safety issues from his early career at the Kansas Department of Transportation, where he initiated and collaborated on the department's annual publications of selected statistics, including Age and Alcohol Traffic Accidents and Accident Statistics.

Mr. Ahmad explained that FTA manages an Annual Performance Plan, which specifies a number of different goals for the agency which must be met in each Fiscal Year (FY). In FY 2007, two goals were established related to safety, security and emergency preparedness. In FY 2008, these two goals have been combined into one over-arching goal.

Mr. Ahmad explained that it has been his pleasure to work with Ms. Schruth, Mr. Taborn, and Mr. McElveen on these goals and their supporting programs. So far, Mr. Ahmad reported that FTA has completed all required activities to meet its FY 2007 safety, security, and emergency preparedness goals, and is well underway to establish its work program for meeting the FY 2008 goal.

Mr. Ahmad urged the participants at the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting to continue their candid dialogue with FTA regarding ways in which in the SSO program can be strengthened. Mr. Ahmad noted that with the reauthorization of SAFETEA-LU being less than two years away, it is an ideal opportunity to raise issues that should be addressed in the next transportation authorization bill. Mr. Ahmad concluded his welcoming remarks by wishing the participants a great meeting.

Brian Lamb, Metro Transit General Manager

Mr. McElveen then introduced Metro Transit General Manager Brian J. Lamb. Mr. Lamb stated that Metro Transit was very pleased to be co-hosting the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting, and to have an opportunity to showcase both the Twin Cities and the Hiawatha Light Rail line.

Mr. Lamb began his comments by explaining that he was a little nervous to be speaking in front of the nation's rail transit safety directors and SSO program managers this Monday morning, because on Sunday afternoon at about 4:00pm, an elderly driver of a van took a U-turn in front of a Hiawatha Light Rail train, causing a collision. While the elderly driver was not seriously injured and no one on the train was hurt, the accident did shut down light rail service for about an hour on a part of the system. Mr. Lamb joked that when he was informed of the accident, the first thing he thought of was that attendees of the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting may have been on the train, and would have a stack of detailed reports waiting for him regarding how Metro Transit managed the accident.

Mr. Lamb then asked the participants, in a show of hands, to indicate who had been to Minneapolis-St. Paul before. Most of the group had never been to the Twin Cities.

Mr. Lamb provided an overview of a few places of interest, including the shops and restaurants along the Nicollet Mall, the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome and the Vikings Stadium. Mr. Lamb also pointed out that the Minnesota Wild, an expansion hockey team, play at the Xcel Energy Center. Mr. Lamb noted that the Republican National Convention will take place at the Xcel Energy Center in early September of next year.

Mr. Lamb cited the importance of gatherings such as the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting to foster relationships between local, State, and Federal levels of government to promote safety, security, and emergency preparedness. Mr. Lamb explained that he has a close working relationship with his SSO agency, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS). He thanked Kent O'Grady and DPS for everything that they accomplished in working with Metro Transit to ensure a compliant safety program for the Hiawatha Light Rail line when the system opened in 2004.

Mr. Lamb explained that when emergencies happen, such as the recent collapse of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi, these relationships and shared commitments can make all of the difference. Mr. Lamb noted that, in close coordination with FTA and U.S. DOT , within days after the bridge collapse, Metro Transit was able to obtain a $5 million grant to support the provision of additional transit service to reduce congestion. Mr. Lamb went on to report that since the collapse, Metro Transit has posted the highest ridership in its history.

Mr. Lamb also identified the ways in which the region's interoperable radio system helped to support effective response. Since Metro Transit was in constant communication with local law enforcement, Minnesota DPS, and other responders, Metro Transit was able to dispatch buses within 15 minutes to transport emergency responders from designated staging areas to specified deployment locations near the river. Metro Transit also was able to re-route its service, and within just a few hours, provide alternate routes to passengers.

Mr. Lamb observed that most Americans take safety for granted. They expect their bridges and roadways, their transit systems, their food, and their toys to be well-designed and free from any threats to their well-being. Americans do not always appreciate what is required to ensure their safety, and they quickly become outraged when their safety is jeopardized. In our society, it is incumbent upon all of us to ensure that we meet all safety standards, and that we maintain constant vigilance in our efforts to provide services and products to the public.

Mr. Lamb then provided a brief overview of Metro Transit's operations. Metro Transit has a fleet of over 820 buses, providing approximately 120 bus routes throughout Minneapolis and St. Paul. Metro Transit is making great gains in reducing fuel emissions by using hybrid buses, next-generation fuels like biodiesel and ultra-low sulfur diesel, and clean diesel technologies. Metro Transit provides approximately 220,000 daily trips on its bus system.

Since 2004, Metro Transit has also operated the Hiawatha Light Rail Line, which links downtown Minneapolis with Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport and the Mall of America. It spans 12 miles and serves 17 stations. Ridership on the line has greatly exceeded exceptions, and has already surpassed the pre-construction estimate for the year 2020. Each day, approximately 30,000 people use the Hiawatha Light Rail system to reach their destinations.

Mr. Lamb noted that Metro Transit is now building its first commuter rail system, the Northstar line. This system will run from the Big Lake area to downtown Minneapolis along Highway 10, and will provide more than 5,000 daily trips. Metro Transit is also investigating expansion options to connect downtown Minneapolis and downtown St. Paul using light rail and bus rapid transit.

Metro Transit, like all transit agencies, is committed to safe and secure operations. Mr. Lamb pointed out that a General Manager's job is challenging, and many different options must be weighed in making decisions. Mr. Lamb stated that while he cannot always give the Metro Transit Safety Department everything it asks for, the on-going dialogue with his Safety Department and the Minnesota DPS is a critical part of his job. Whenever possible, he works with the Metro Transit Safety Department and Minnesota DPS to address issues proactively and effectively. Mr. Lamb concluded his welcoming remarks by wishing everyone a successful meeting.

Assistant Commissioner Tim Leslie, Minnesota Department of Public Safety

Mr. McElveen next introduced Lt. Tim Rogotzke, the SSO Program Manager for Minnesota DPS. Lt. Rogotzke then introduced Assistant Commissioner Tim Leslie from Minnesota DPS. Assistant Commissioner Leslie welcomed the participants at the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting to Minneapolis. He thanked Lt. Rogotzke for introducing him, and for his hard work in taking over from Kent O'Grady in managing the SSO program for the State of Minnesota.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie also noted that since the State Police fall within Minnesota DPS, the agency has a tremendous amount of experience with traffic safety and accident investigation, and a vested interest in mitigating those situations which lead to unsafe behavior on the State's roadways and transit systems.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie clarified that though the Twin Cities may appear as one city to the rest of the nation, here is Minnesota, the river dividing the two cities is very important. Assistant Commissioner Leslie explained how he grew up in Minneapolis and then spent the first part of his career working in law enforcement in St. Paul. He noted that there are significant differences between the two cities and their residents, and that these differences are the source of wide-spread humor in the region.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie observed that though there are challenges in uniting a varied region and getting people to work together, overall the region shares a strong commitment to safety and emergency preparedness. Assistant Commissioner Leslie commended the FTA, the SSO agencies, and the rail transit agencies for making a point of getting together and knowing each other well in advance of an actual accident or emergency. Assistant Commissioner Leslie pointed out that an emergency is not the time to be exchanging business cards.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie clarified that Minnesota DPS and Metro Transit are united in their mission to respond well and effectively when things go wrong. Assistant Commissioner Leslie noted that no one wants to be criticized for a delay in providing needed resources to support victims and their families. While it sometimes is a thankless job, there are rewards in knowing that you and your agency have done the best you can to help people during the most difficult of situations.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie then described the response to the I-35W bridge collapse on August 1, 2007. The bridge over the Mississippi collapsed during rush hour, plunging dozens of cars and their occupants into the river. The calamity disrupted transportation, aimed a spotlight on public infrastructure, and evoked an outpouring of public response.

In addition to the heroic stories of the victims on the bridge working to help each other, Assistant Commissioner Leslie pointed out that the public service agencies, including Metro Transit, responded incredibly well and cooperatively. Because the region has an excellent interoperable communications system, all of the involved responders could talk to each other and respond quickly to changing needs and conditions. Also, as a result of extensive regional emergency planning and frequent drills and exercises, the responders knew each other and the respective capabilities of each other's agencies. Activities that may take many hours in some places were accomplished in minutes during the bridge response.

Assistant Commissioner Leslie also described how Minnesota DPS and Metro Transit are working together to plan for the 2008 Republican National Convention. The Twin Cities are proud to have been selected to host such an important event.

However, even one year out, there is a tremendous amount of work required to ensure a successful event. Assistant Commissioner Leslie noted that, once again, Minnesota DPS, other public safety agencies, and Metro Transit are in the difficult position of working to ensure that nothing goes wrong. Assistant Commissioner Leslie explained that though their activities may be taken for granted during the actual Convention, it is critical to go through the planning phase to ensure the safety and security of all attendees and the eventual Republican Presidential nominee.

In conclusion, Assistant Commissioner Leslie commended the assembled group for their commitment to transportation safety and security. He noted that through the SSO program, State agencies could work cooperatively and effectively with their rail transit agencies to prevent accidents, to investigate accidents and do occur, to develop corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and to ensure the protection of rail transit passengers and employees.

2.  STATUS OF SSO AUDIT PROGRAM AND FINDINGS

Following the welcoming remarks, Mr. Jim Caton and Mr. Andy Lofton, FTA SSO program contractors, delivered the meeting's first presentation. Their presentation, entitled "SSO Audit Program 2007," provided an update on FTA's SSO audit program and a summary of key findings identified through the program during 2007. They began by describing the audit process, walking the participants through a typical audit timeline as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1.    Audit Timeline

 Figure 1 presents a timeline for Audit.  Nofification occurs ten weeks prior to the audit;  audit materials due 6 weeks prior; record of Internal Preliminary Findings occurs 2 weeks prior; Audit duration is 2 - 3 days; the Final Report is due 2 weeks after the Audit; and finally, the Resolution of Findings must occcur within 60 days.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton reviewed the materials that must be submitted electronically by each SSO agency 4 weeks prior to the audit. These materials include copies of the SSO agency's Program Standard and supporting procedures, and copies of critical materials for each rail transit agency in the SSO agency's jurisdiction, including the following:

  • System Safety Program Plans (SSPPs),
  • System Security Plans (SSPs),
  • Completed SSPP and SSP review checklists,
  • Current internal safety and security audit program schedules for the rail transit agencies and annual reports from the previous three years,
  • Three-Year Safety and Security Review final reports,
  • Hazard resolution tracking logs,
  • The three most recent accident investigation reports for each rail transit agency, including corrective action plans, and
  • The corrective action plan tracking log being used by the SSO agency.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained that these materials are used by the audit team to familiarize themselves with how the SSO agency and rail transit agency are implementing 49 CFR Part 659 requirements. The audit team also uses these materials to populate audit checklists, maximizing verification efforts prior to the onsite records review, and facilitating finalization of audit schedules by prioritizing SSO program areas. Finally, these materials are used to develop and document pre-audit concerns and to refine questions and establish verification points for the onsite reviews and interviews.

Each audit takes approximately 3 to 4 days to complete on-site and is performed by a 3 to 4 person audit team. Audit attendees usually include the SSO agency Program Manager, the SSO agency contractor (if applicable), and safety and security department representatives from the rail transit agency.

Unlike in the past, where the SSO audits took place at the SSO agency headquarters, in 2007, most of the SSO audits have been conducted at a rail transit agency in the SSO agency's jurisdiction. This change provides FTA's SSO audit team with the chance to review records at the rail transit agency and, if appropriate, to observe specific functions, activities, or concerns that are being managed through the SSO program.

Each audit begins with an entrance briefing that is used to set the agenda for the audit and to explain the activities that will be performed. Interviews are conducted onsite using an audit checklist. Oversight processes and implementation issues are discussed, and feedback is solicited from audit participants.

The audit team also performs records reviews to verify program implementation, and SSO agency and rail transit agency documentation. As appropriate, an on-site tour or examination may be included as part of the SSO audit. Once the audit is complete, the audit team holds an exit briefing with the SSO and rail transit agency representatives to present preliminary findings and recommendations.

In making findings, Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained that FTA has developed criteria to identify those instances where an element of a State's safety oversight program is determined to be either in "Non-Compliance" or in "Compliance with Recommendation."

  • Non-Compliance - FTA determines that a required component of an oversight agency's and rail transit agency's program does not meet Part 659 requirements.
  • Compliance with Recommendation - FTA determines that a component of an oversight agency's and rail transit agency's program technically meets the requirement of Part 659, but can be improved to meet the intent of Part 659 or support more effective implementation.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained how FTA's audit team makes these findings. As specified in the revised 49 CFR Part 659, there is a listing of approximately 250 distinct activities that the SSO program administered by the State must perform. If the SSO program is not performing one of these activities, a finding of "non-compliance" is made. If a State is performing the activity, but the audit team has identified opportunities for improvement based on outstanding recommendations to FTA from NTSB or the GAO related to this activity, then a "compliance with recommendation" finding is made. All other activities found to be in compliance are classified as "compliant" and no findings are made.

FTA also uses the audit process as an opportunity to identify effective practices. These practices are referenced by the SSO audit team during the exit briefing. Finally, if additional technical assistance is provided during the audit, this assistance is also noted during the exit briefing.

Once the audit has been completed, a Final Audit Report is developed to present audit activities and findings. The final report is typically delivered within 2 weeks of the audit. FTA requires that the SSO agency address all findings of "non-compliance" within 60 days. FTA includes, as part of its Final Audit Report, an Audit Findings Tracking Matrix, which contains all of the findings and provides columns for the SSO agency to describe its proposed corrective actions. FTA uses this matrix to work with the SSO agency to track all findings to closure.

When completing its responses to the audit report, the SSO agency is required to address all findings of "non-compliance." FTA also encourages each SSO agency to address each finding of "compliance with recommendation." However, in the event the SSO agency determines not to address these findings, then FTA does require that the agency provides its rationale for not addressing the "compliance with recommendation" finding.

FTA then tracks all audit findings and resolution efforts, sending out monthly reminders if findings are not closed within the 60 day period. In certain instances, depending on the nature of the finding, the SSO agency may require several months to complete the corrective action. In these cases, FTA may require bi-monthly or even quarterly updates rather than monthly updates.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton then explained that all data gathered through the audit is logged into FTA's SSO Audit Program Database to support program assessment and tracking of findings across the industry. FTA also uses this information to support its management of the SSO program and to update the Rail Transit Safety Action Plan.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton next summarized the audit program findings identified during the current audit cycle, which included audits performed on the SSO Programs of the Tennessee DOT , Missouri DOT , St. Clair County, California PUC , Florida DOT , Arkansas HTD , Michigan DOT , Louisiana DOTD , and Texas DOT . Figure 2 summarizes the number of non-compliance and compliance with recommendation findings generated during the current audit cycle.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton further clarified the findings of non-compliance identified through the 2007 SSO Program Audit cycle. The most common findings involved situations where:

 Figure 2 summarizes the number of non-compliance (64 open findings, 25 closed findings for a total of 89) and compliance with recommendation findings (24 open findings, 16 closed findings for a total of 40) generated during the current audit cycle.  Figure 2 also graphs the finding by the following program areas: Program Management/SSPP = 30 (23%); SSPP and Security Plan = 19 (15%); Internal Safety and Security Reviews = 12 (9%); Three-Year Reviews = 8 (6%); Accident Notification & Investigation & CAPS = 42 (33%); Hazard Management = 15 (12%); and Reporting tot FTA = 3 (2%).

SSO agencies had approved SSPPs that did not address specific provisions contained within the SSO agency's Program Standard or specific provisions within 49 CFR Part 659;

  • SSO agencies had not approved or adopted accident investigation procedures used by rail transit agencies or by their own personnel;
  • SSO agencies had not developed, approved or adopted accident investigation reports from the rail transit agencies in their jurisdiction;
  • SSO agencies had not implemented mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of corrective action plans;
  • SSO and rail transit agencies were not implementing their hazard management processes as documented in the Program Standard and SSPPs; and
  • SSO agencies failed to have mechanisms to assure ongoing reporting of hazards resolution activities by the rail transit agencies.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton next reviewed the finding classifications used by FTA to track and close-out findings. These classifications are defined as follows:

  • Closed - SSO agency has implemented the recommended actions and provided FTA with requested verification materials.
  • Open Acceptable Action - SSO agency has begun implementing recommended action or proposed alternative action acceptable to FTA and has provided a projected completion date that is also acceptable to FTA.
  • Open Unacceptable Action - SSO agency has not begun to implement the recommended corrective action and has not proposed an acceptable alternative action, it has not provided a projected completion date for addressing the finding, and/or the SSO agency has not responded to FTA findings.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton stated that, to date, only one (1) SSO agency has closed all of its audit findings. Sixty-eight (68) percent of all audit findings identified through the 2007 SSO Program Audit cycle have not been closed. Forty (40) percent of the agencies audited in 2007 have failed to meet submission deadlines. In addition, 30% of these agencies have failed to submit the Audit Findings Tracking Matrix on a consistent basis.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton also provided examples of acceptable and unacceptable reasons for the SSO agency to delay resolution of audit findings. Acceptable reasons for delay included revisions to codes or standards that could not be expedited because they required approvals of State legislative bodies or extensive legal reviews, or the SSO agency's inability of verify implementation of corrective action until a specific event occurred, such as an accident, submittal of an annual report, or an annual certification. Unacceptable reasons for delay include non-responsiveness, and delays in revisions without clearly identifying action plans and milestone dates.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton then explained how FTA tracks and manages those situations where SSO agencies fail to close out findings. FTA first sends routine emails requesting updates on the status of required materials. In the event of non-responsiveness, Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton explained that FTA will first issue a letter to the SSO Program Manager's direct supervisor(s) asking for additional support in getting the findings closed. FTA may also coordinate with its Regional Offices and review capital project funding to get a letter issued directly to the rail transit agency.

Mr. Caton and Mr. Lofton concluded their presentation by emphasizing the need for continued compliance with FTA's SSO Audit Program and FTA's desire to continue its partnership with the SSO community. Through this program, FTA hopes to increase the quality of safety and security program implementation, to collect effective practices that can be shared with industry, and to provide technical assistance when possible.

Comments and Discussion

Following this presentation, representatives from several of the audited SSO agencies and their rail transit agencies were asked to discuss their audit experiences. The following issues were raised:

  • Cost and Burden of FTA Audit: SSO and rail transit agencies found the costs associated with an FTA audit, including the costs of compiling the requested audit materials and the costs of SSO personnel/contractor support for the audit, to be burdensome. States suggested that FTA collect information on these costs, so they would have a realistic assessment of the impact of the audits, and how much time they take away from SSO agency and rail transit agency efforts to address actual safety issues in their programs. FTA responded that it appreciates the burden associated with its audits. However, FTA expects that SSO agencies should have the documentation requested by FTA readily available as part of their day-to-day management of their program. Also, FTA hopes that the benefits of the audits, including the identification and resolution of deficient elements in the State's SSO program, ultimately outweigh the costs and burdens associated with the audit.
  • FTA Audit Schedule: The SSO agencies and rail transit agencies liked having FTA's FY 2007 audit schedule emailed to them in October of 2006. However, members of the SSO community noted that FTA made changes to this schedule and did not email an updated version out to the community. SSO and rail transit agencies requested that FTA's FY 2008 Audit Program Schedule be emailed out as soon as possible, and that as the schedule is revised, FTA email out updated versions, so that States and rail transit agencies can budget resources in advance of the actual audits.
  • "Compliance with Recommendation" Finding Category: There was extensive discussion regarding the "compliance with recommendation" finding category and why FTA would issue findings it did not have the authority to enforce. Several rail transit agencies considered this practice, on the part of FTA, to be a bad auditing practice. FTA explained that both NTSB and GAO have made open recommendations to FTA regarding issues such as resources devoted by the States to the SSO program, training made available to SSO and rail transit safety personnel, and the safety reporting relationships in the rail transit agency. FTA can only address these open recommendations by making "compliance with recommendation" findings to the SSO agency. However, FTA appreciates the validity of the industry's concerns regarding FTA's "compliance with recommendation" findings from an auditing perspective.
  • Opportunity to Comment on FTA Final Audit Report: Several representatives from both SSO agencies and rail transit agencies felt that FTA's Final Audit Reports should be delivered, first, in draft form, to enable the SSO agencies and rail transit agencies to provide comments, and potentially to address some of the findings before they actually appear in the report. SSO personnel noted that, in its guidance materials, FTA encourages SSO agencies to deliver their Three-Year Safety Reviews in draft to the rail transit agencies to receive comments. These representatives asked why FTA does not follow its own recommended practice. In response, FTA noted that during the Exit Briefing, FTA provides a viewgraph presentation with its findings and allows opportunity for discussion and comment. FTA views this presentation as a draft report. FTA also noted that in response to these presentations, findings have been changed or reworded. However, FTA representatives agreed that they would review the current approach, and determine if perhaps these reports should be issued in draft to provide the opportunity for additional comments from SSO and rail transit agency personnel.
  • Need for Additional FTA Outreach with Executives in State Agencies: SSO personnel felt that FTA's audit process, while basically sound, did not reach high enough within their organizations. By conducting the audits at the rail transit agencies, and by focusing on the immediate supervisors rather than executive directors, these representatives felt that FTA did not take advantage of the opportunity to meet with SSO agency executive directors and to encourage support for the program. SSO personnel believe that FTA can provide valuable assistance to them in raising the profile of their programs within their own agencies. SSO personnel urged FTA to use its authority to "market" the SSO program with Executive Directors in the States. FTA responded that it would work to identify ways to reach out to executive leadership in State DOTs and other State agencies with responsibility for the SSO program. For example, FTA is developing a "Dear Colleague" letter from the FTA Administrator to the Governor of each State and the Executive Directors of each SSO agency to explain FTA's new SSO Program Managers Training Curriculum and to solicit their support.
  • Discretion of States with Limited Resources: SSO personnel at a few States felt that FTA should give the States more leeway to focus on specific issues that States felt were important, even if it meant focusing less attention on specific provisions with 49 CFR Part 659. For example, if a rail transit agency had an extension coming on-line, the State should be able to use its limited resources to oversee the extension, and not to focus on specific Part 659 issues that were less pressing. FTA responded by stating that 49 CFR Part 659 provisions have been established as minimum requirements and cannot be waived based on situational concerns at a given rail transit agency.
  • States with Authority Exceeding 49 CFR Part 659: Also, during this question-andanswer session, there was considerable discussion in response to a question from a rail transit agency representative from California regarding specific findings from a Three-Year Safety Review that had just been conducted at his property. These findings were made to address additional authority that the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has to enforce standards regarding overhead electrification systems for light rail. This representative asked if FTA believed that findings related to additional authorities that SSO agencies have, above and beyond 49 CFR Part 659, should be included in the Three-Year Safety Review Final Report. FTA explained that this decision was at the discretion of the SSO agency. FTA also clarified that during its SSO audits, FTA's audit team does not evaluate State implementation of requirements developed to address authorities that exceed 49 CFR Part 659.

3.   HAZARD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CLARIFICATION LETTER

Ms. Annabelle Boyd, FTA SSO program contractor, gave a presentation on the September 6, 2007 clarification letter issued by FTA on the hazard management program requirements specified in 49 CFR Part 659. Ms. Boyd explained that participants at the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting should have received FTA's September 6, 2007 clarification letter via email and that it was in hard copy as part of their hand-outs for this meeting.

Ms. Boyd noted that FTA prepared this letter in response to questions received from SSO agencies and rail transit agencies regarding how the hazard management program, specified in the revised 49 CFR Part 659, should be developed, documented, administered, and monitored. Ms. Boyd explained that this letter provides background regarding why FTA developed these new requirements in the revised Part 659; a detailed explanation of these requirements, including direct references to the applicable 49 CFR Part 659 provisions; and examples of effective practices used by SSO agencies and rail transit agencies to implement these provisions in their respective programs.

Ms. Boyd reminded participants that Section 659.39 of FTA's original rule required SSO agencies to get involved in the rail transit agency's hazard management program primarily during the identification, investigation and resolution of accidents and "unacceptable hazardous conditions." During public notice and comment undertaken for the Part 659 rule revision, both SSO agencies and rail transit agencies expressed their frustration with this approach. Both complained about the subjectivity inherent in defining an "unacceptable hazardous condition." SSO agencies also noted that, because of this subjectivity, occasionally, these investigations became unnecessarily adversarial. SSO agencies also complained that they had no authority to require on-going reporting regarding the rail transit agency's hazard management program.

As FTA explained in the preamble to the revised rule, FTA changed the hazard management program requirements to resolve these issues. Through these new requirements, FTA intended for the SSO agencies to actively monitor the rail transit agency's performance of the hazard management program in an ongoing manner. SSO agencies would no longer become involved in this program only after an accident or an "unacceptable hazardous condition" had been identified. Further, by removing the vast majority of minor accidents and single-person injuries from SSO accident reporting thresholds, FTA responded to recommendations from rail transit agencies that these minor occurrences would be more effectively addressed through the hazard management program.

FTA intended for this new approach to be a "win-win" for all involved parties. Rail transit agencies could document and manage minor incidents, such as slips, trips, and falls and other single-person injuries, through the hazard management program with less administrative burden. SSO agencies would receive on-going updates regarding the status of rail transit agency activities to address these minor incidents and other concerns through the hazard management program. Should a rail transit agency identify an "unacceptable hazardous condition," then the SSO agency would be much better prepared to support an investigation.

Ms. Boyd next reviewed each of the sections of Part 659 that establish the hazard management program requirements. Ms. Boyd began with the revised section 659.15 (b)(8), which requires the SSO agencies, in their Program Standards, to identify their requirements for "ongoing communication and coordination relating to the identification, categorization, resolution, and reporting of hazards to the oversight agency."

Ms. Boyd explained that this provision gives each SSO agency the authority to require ongoing reporting from each rail transit agency in its jurisdiction regarding the performance of its hazard management program. This section also provides SSO agencies with the authority to require notification and investigation reports or other information regarding the identification of specific types or categories of hazards at the rail transit agency.

Ms. Boyd then addressed Part 659.19 (f), which defines minimum requirements for what must be contained in the rail transit agency's hazard management program. In § 659.19 (f), FTA authorizes each SSO agency to require each rail transit agency to include in its System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) "a description of the rail transit agency's process used to implement its hazard management program, including activities for:

(1) Hazard identification;
(2) Hazard investigation, evaluation and analysis;
(3) Hazard control and elimination;
(4) Hazard tracking; and
(5) Requirements for on-going reporting to the oversight agency relating to hazard management activities and status."

Section 659.19 (f) requires that each SSPP contain a section that addresses each of the five items specified in § 659.19 (f). Ms. Boyd explained, that in meeting the fifth item specified in § 659.19 (f), FTA expects that each rail transit agency will include a description of how it will provide ongoing reporting to the SSO agency regarding the activities performed in the hazard management program and the status of findings and hazard mitigation activities. Ms. Boyd also noted that this description should conform to any requirements specified by the SSO agency in its Program Standard to address 49 CFR 659.15 (b)(8).

Ms. Boyd then explained that Section 659.31 provides additional clarification regarding the authority conferred to each SSO agency to require each rail transit agency in its jurisdiction to develop, implement, and document, in its SSPP , a program to identify and resolve hazards. Ms. Boyd pointed out that Section 659.31 (a) states that this program must include "any hazards resulting from subsequent system extensions or modifications, operational changes, or other changes within the rail transit environment."

Ms. Boyd also noted that Section 659.31 (b) requires that the hazard management program implemented by the rail transit agency "must, at a minimum:

(1) Define the rail transit agency's approach to hazard management and the implementation of an integrated system-wide hazard resolution process;
(2) Specify the sources of, and the mechanisms to support, the on-going identification of hazards within the rail transit agency;
(3) Define the process by which identified hazards will be evaluated and prioritized for elimination or control by the rail transit agency;
(4) Identify the mechanism used by the rail transit agency to track, through resolution, the identified hazard(s);
(5) Define the rail transit agency's minimum thresholds for the notification and reporting of hazard(s) to state oversight agencies; and
(6) Specify the process by which the rail transit agency will provide on-going reporting of hazard resolution activities to the state oversight agency."

Ms. Boyd further explained that Section 659.31 provides each SSO agency with the authority to require each rail transit agency to document, in its SSPP or supporting procedures, the following:

  • The rail transit agency's overall approach to implementing an integrated, system-wide hazard resolution process (i.e., not only to address operational hazards, but also hazards from system extensions/modification, operational changes, or other changes within the rail transit environment);
  • Sources and mechanisms used by the rail transit agency to identify hazards (i.e., customer complaints, employee reports, review of near-miss incidents and control center logs, analysis of maintenance records, accident investigations, formal hazard analysis, etc.);
  • Processes used by the rail transit agency to evaluate and prioritize hazards (i.e., formal hazard analysis, informal assessment based on experience and technical recommendations, trending analysis, consultant reviews, manufacturer's recommendations, etc.);
  • Tracking systems used by the rail transit agency to record the results of these analyses and the status of identified mitigation activities (i.e., information management systems, databases, paper records, committee meeting minutes, etc.);
  • Thresholds, specified by the SSO agency in its Program Standard, which if triggered, require the rail transit agency to notify the SSO agency, within a time-frame specified by the SSO agency in its Program Standard;
  • Any required investigation reports or other documents to be provided by the rail transit agency to the SSO agency, as specified in the SSO agency's Program Standard, regarding any hazard that triggers the hazard notification threshold; and
  • The process to be used by the rail transit agency for reporting ongoing hazard management program activities to the SSO agency (i.e., monthly or quarterly logs, monthly or quarterly meetings, SSO participation on RTA Hazard Resolution Committees, etc.).

Ms. Boyd then addressed Sections 659.17 and 659.25 of the revised rule, which confer the authority to each SSO agency, through the annual SSPP update, review, and approval process, to ensure that 49 CFR Part 659 hazard management program requirements are adequately addressed in the rail transit agency's SSPP . If the rail transit agency's SSPP does not comply with § 659.19 (f) and § 659.31 (a) and (b) requirements, or with the ongoing reporting provisions specified in the SSO agency's Program Standard to address section 659.15 (b)(8), then the SSO agency may reject the SSPP . This rejection would occur through the same review and approval process the SSO agency uses to ensure SSPP conformance to other § 659.19 requirements and its Program Standard.

Ms. Boyd then provided some examples of ways in which SSO agencies and rail transit agencies have complied with these provisions. For example, Ms. Boyd noted that, in Program Standards or procedures, SSO agencies ensure "ongoing communication and coordination" regarding the rail transit agency's implementation of the hazard management program by requesting the following:

  • Submission of a monthly or quarterly hazard tracking log maintained by the rail transit agency;
  • Direct access to web-based systems used by the rail transit agency to report, manage, and track hazards or submission of weekly, monthly, or quarterly reports from these systems;
  • Monthly or quarterly submission of the actual reports collected by the rail transit agency from various sources regarding reported hazards;
  • Monthly or quarterly teleconferences or in-person meetings to discuss the hazards identified by the rail transit agency and the activities being taken to address them; or
  • SSO agency participation on the rail transit agency's Hazard Resolution Committee or other equivalent committee or task force that meets regularly to discuss the rail transit agency's implementation of its hazard management program.

Based on Initial Submissions made to FTA by May 1, 2006, and the results of SSO Audits conducted over the last 15 months, Ms. Boyd explained that the most common methods used to address these requirements include:

  • Monthly or quarterly hazard tracking logs provided by the rail transit agency to the SSO agency; or
  • SSO agency participation in the rail transit agency's Hazard Resolution Committee Meetings, or other equivalent committee meetings, and receipt of all minutes, logs, and correspondence from these committees.

    Ms. Boyd noted that a sample hazard tracking matrix is located on Page 58 in Chapter 9 of FTA's Implementation Guidelines for 49 CFR Part 659. Detailed recommendations for requiring a hazard management program that complies with 49 CFR Part 659 provisions are included in Section 6 - Hazard Management Process of Appendix E: Program Requirements for Development of a Rail Transit Agency SSPP , located in FTA's Resource Toolkit for State Oversight Agencies Implementing 49 CFR Part 659.

    4.  IMPLEMENTING PART 659 HAZARD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

    Mr. Al Fazio, General Manager, New Jersey Transit, River LINE, and Vice President, Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, facilitated this session, which included four presenters from the rail transit industry, who described their approaches to identifying, resolving, and tracking hazards.

    During his introductory comments, Mr. Fazio explained that as a General Manager, he considers an active focus on hazard management to be the best form of "enlightened self interest." Though he acknowledges that other General Managers may not be deeply invested in their agency's system safety programs, Mr. Fazio stated that, for him, in this day and age of 24-hour media and complex relationships with oversight agencies, he could not imagine a situation where he could run his agency and not be actively involved in the implementation of the hazard management program.

    Mr. Fazio also explained that, while he is the General Manager of New Jersey Transit River LINE, he is not an employee of New Jersey Transit. Mr. Fazio noted that the operation and maintenance of the River LINE system is managed entirely by Bombardier, under contract to New Jersey Transit. As more and more rail transit service is being provided by contractors, Mr. Fazio explained that there is a movement within the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) to refer to rail transit agencies as "rail transit systems."

    Mr. Fazio explained that while this change in terminology may seem insignificant, it is actually quite important because it recognizes that contractors, too, have accountability for critical functions, such as safety, during rail transit operations and maintenance. Therefore, in the APTA Rail Transit Standards Program and other APTA materials, "rail transit system" will be used increasingly more often as a term of the trade.

    Mr. Fazio noted that one of the most challenging parts of his job is distinguishing real risk from imaginary risk. For example, he explained that most of River LINE's track runs through suburban areas where there are no threats from overhead construction, and in many cases, no buildings located adjacent to the tracks. River LINE operates Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs) so there are no overhead catenary wires. Therefore, he was actively involved in a hazard assessment which determined that River LINE's track workers did not need to wear hardhats. These workers instead now wear ball caps, which are more comfortable in the field and provide less distraction for workers who must bend over and turn their heads as part of their jobs. By assessing real risk, instead of imagined risks, River LINE was able to ensure safety and to avoid wasting its limited resources enforcing requirements for unnecessary personal protective equipment.

    Mr. Fazio also noted that this focus on managing real risks has proved invaluable in working with State and Federal oversight agencies and Conrail to ensure River LINE's access to track on the general railroad system. Mr. Fazio pointed out that River LINE's DMU operate on 34 miles of single track with passing sidings from Camden to Trenton, and a 1.5 mile street-running section of embedded track in Camden. Approximately 24 miles of this alignment is on the general railroad system.

    River LINE provides service on this track under the terms of a temporal separation waiver with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). To make this work, River LINE uses a combination of advanced rail traffic control, automatic train stop signaling, and temporal separation that yields maximum safety and track availability for passengers and freight. River LINE's operations control center also dispatches ConRail freight traffic at night, Sunday through Friday.

    Because of FRA oversight, Mr. Fazio explained that River LINE's operating rules are a Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) derivative with additional rules in place for light rail transit operations. However, since River LINE has been waived from some FRA requirements, River LINE also falls under 49 CFR Part 659, and participates in the SSO program managed by New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT).

    As a result, River LINE has to work with FRA , FTA and NJDOT to continually demonstrate that running trains at 60 mph over single track with tightly timed meets at sidings, under conditions of temporal separation with freight traffic, is safe. Largely through River LINE's commitment to its program for assessing and controlling hazards, Mr. Fazio noted that River LINE has been able to work with FRA , NJDOT , and Conrail to extend River LINE's service hours and to ensure track access for special events.

    Mr. Fazio concluded his comments by stating that it is a very exciting time to be providing light rail passenger service on the general railroad system. Hazard management and appropriate risk identification and mitigation are critical to the success of this service, and to continued dialogue with FRA regarding the possibility, one day, of truly intermingled freight and light rail service on the general railroad system. Mr. Fazio urged anyone who was interested in these topics to consider attending the 14th Railway Age Passenger Trains on Freight Railroads Conference, October 22-23, 2007, in Washington D.C.

    a. Internet Based Hazard Tracking Systems

    Mr. Fazio then introduced the first speaker in the session, Mr. Henry Hartberg, Senior Manager of Operations Safety, Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART).

    Mr. Hartberg provided a description of DART's automated approach to identifying, assessing, managing, and tracking hazards. Mr. Hartberg noted that DART uses a proprietary, automated Workflow system to manage administrative tasks and that hazard identification and reporting have been incorporated into this system.

    Mr. Hartberg pointed out that DART's Workflow system started in the late 1990s as a way to assign, track, and monitor accounts payable items as they moved through the procurement process. However, it quickly became apparent that this system, which enables users throughout the agency to handle and follow-up on workflow actions easily, and which allows supervisors and managers to monitor activities in real-time and to use graphical reports, had wide-spread applicability for a range of DART functions.

    Mr. Hartberg explained that, in the beginning, the developers of this system were widely soliciting additional functions and features. Mr. Hartberg met with them and proposed that a hazard identification reporting function be included in the system.

    For this function, Mr. Hartberg identified some of the challenges he faced in managing hazards that he believed could be addressed through an automated system:

    • Making reporting accessible to everyone, so anyone could log on to the system and electronically file a hazard identification report;
    • Enabling the forwarding of reported hazards to supervisors and managers in departments with the authority to assess and resolve the reported hazard;
    • Maintaining a transparent record of actions, so it was clear whether action had been taken and what specifically had been done;
    • Supporting the integration of the hazard management process at levels of the agency, enabling supervisors and managers to communicate with the Bus Safety Committee (BSC), Rail Safety Committee (RSC), and DART Safety Committee (DSC) regarding hazard reports, assessment and actions, and other activities; and
    • Supporting retrieval of records to enhance follow-up, verification, and close-out for hazards.

    Further, Mr. Hartberg wanted to make sure that the person filing the hazard report, his or her supervisor, and the DART Safety Department would receive automated emails notifying them of any new activity performed to address the hazard.

    Mr. Hartberg also wanted the system to ensure that the hazard identification report was a simple form that the person reporting the hazard could quickly and easily file. Once the hazard identification report was filed, Mr. Hartberg noted that the DART Safety Department would need to use the system to:

    • Initiate or delegate requests for action;
    • Monitor the status on-going requests;
    • Send reminder emails and status update requests;
    • Report on actions performed;
    • Report on actions not performed;
    • Provide real-time follow-up and alerts to the BSC , RSC , and DSC, as appropriate; and
    • Ensure that, through the workflow, all involved individuals receive emails advising them of: actions assigned to them, actions they are requested to assign, requests that have been closed, actions overdue or cancelled, and final close-out of the hazard.

    Finally, Mr. Hartberg wanted the system to provide the ability, at any time, to check the status of actions performed to address the reported hazard and to provide reports, through scorecards or other features, tracking the time required to close the hazard, the number and types of reported hazards, and the individuals involved.

    Mr. Hartberg noted that he was lucky to work with the system developers at the beginning of the process, when DART had not yet fully committed to the Workflow system. The hazard reporting function was only the third or fourth workflow developed, and received a lot of attention and care from the developers.

    Now, DART's in-house, web-based, automated task distribution program is greatly in demand, and the developers are back-logged with dozens of requests for new workflows. However, through the strong relationship Mr. Hartberg was able to build with the developers, he was also able to get workflows for DART's random drug testing program and periodic employee physical program. To date, over 60 other workflows are used by DART.

    Mr. Hartberg then reviewed screenshots from the hazard reporting Workflow, walking the participants of the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting through the steps involved. Mr. Hartberg noted the following:

    • A Hazard identification report will be submitted either through the Hazard ID Workflow or be submitted to the DART Safety Department for input into the Hazard ID Workflow.
      • Rail and bus operators and maintenance personnel can enter hazards directly into the system through kiosks located in their break rooms or by asking their supervisors to file them on their behalf.
      • Hazards from other sources, such as customer service complaints, or as a result of internal safety audits, rule compliance programs, or accidents or near misses, will be entered into the system by DART Safety personnel.
    • Once input, either by the initiators themselves or by DART Safety personnel, the Hazard ID Workflow item will be forwarded to the immediate supervisor who shall investigate the report and initiate a resolution if possible.
      • DART encourages the resolution of hazards at the lowest level possible, and the DART Safety Committee, which is comprised of DART senior management, actively follows up with managers and directors who fail to take action.
    • If a supervisor or manager is unable to resolve the hazard, then the supervisor or manager shall forward the Hazard ID form and his or her response to the appropriate Division, Sub-Safety Committee or the DART Bus Safety Committee (BSC), the DART Rail Safety Committee (RSC), or DART Safety Committee (DSC) for review and resolution.
    • The decision on where best to forward the Hazard ID will be based on the best judgment of the supervisor/manager.
    • The appropriate committee shall review the Hazard ID and initiate a recommendation (if necessary) for resolution whenever feasible.
    • If the submitting employee is not satisfied with the response from the supervisor or the RSC / BSC level, the committee shall forward the Hazard ID , along with all recommendations and evaluations, to the DSC for further consideration. The DSC may either accept the recommendations as presented or may initiate their own resolution to the hazard. The DSC decision is final.
    • All open Hazard ID forms will be reviewed and updated at all pertinent safety committees on a monthly basis.
    • When planning the resolution of an assessed hazard, the actions of the resolving body are guided by DART's hazard resolution guidelines.
    • To verify that a proposed resolution has been implemented and has achieved the desired results requires follow-up. Follow-up is the responsibility of both the DSC and the responsible departments using statistical analysis and audits as the primary methods.
    • To ensure the on-going role in the oversight of the rail transit agency's hazard management process, DART provides a monthly hazard tracking log that is a function of the Hazard ID Workflow and is organized by hazard identification number. Open hazard I.D.s will be submitted to DART's State Safety Oversight Agency, TxDOT, monthly through the safety committee minutes.
    • TxDOT will review the monthly hazard activity and forward any questions or requests for information to the rail agency. TxDOT is sent the minutes of all safety committee meetings once each month after the DART Safety Committee has taken place.
    • In addition, DART will conduct meetings with TxDOT upon request and will maintain electronic contact on a regular basis.
    • During application of the hazard management process, for any hazard identified as an "unacceptable hazardous condition," the DART Safety Department will notify the TxDOT designated point-of-contact within 24 hours by use of the " TxDOT Notification of a Reportable Accident/Incident, or Hazardous Condition" form. In addition, the appropriate safety committee will conduct an investigation, lead by the DART Safety Department.
    • At the conclusion of the investigation, the final investigation report will be provided to TxDOT for review and comment. Any corrective action plans developed as a result of the investigation will be reviewed and approved by TxDOT. The state oversight agency retains the authority to request a status briefing on any unacceptable hazardous condition investigation.

    Mr. Hartberg pointed out that, using the system, supervisors and employees can choose different actions from drop down menus, such as "Move to Safety Action Required," which sends the form back to the Safety Department, "Close," "Reject," "Reassign," or "Provide Comments." The "Close" option is only a suggestion to close and requires the Safety Department to review the form and hazard log history before sending it through the Workflow process, which moves the item directly to the DSC for review. Once reviewed by the Committee, the Safety Department can choose "Permanently Close This Item" from the drop down menu, which provides final hazard closure. Any action or reporting tied to the hazard log item is tracked and linked to the item through the "Event History." This creates a complete file for the hazard report.

    Mr. Hartberg also informed the participants at the 11th Annual SSO Program Meeting that the DART system is password protected and that only Mr. Hartberg or his designated proxy has the ability to close an item