Since the fall of 1998, the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) State Safety Oversight Audit Program has produced a number of findings regarding the application of the hazard identification and resolution process at the rail fixed guideway systems
(RFGS) affected by the Rule. While States are successfully ensuring the inclusion of this process in their Program Standards and in RFGS System Safety Program Plans
(SSPPs), its actual implementation by the affected agencies is inconsistent and does not always reflect the procedures approved by the Oversight Agencies.
Implementation of this process is required by 49 CFR Part 659.39, which specifies that RFGS must notify the Oversight Agency of
unacceptable hazardous conditions. The Rule defines an unacceptable hazardous condition as "a hazardous condition determined to be an 'unacceptable hazardous condition' using the APTA Guideline's Hazard Resolution Matrix (American Public Transit Association,
Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System Safety Program Plans, Checklist Number 7)."
The hazard analysis process is a critical part of an agency's System Safety Program. This process provides a mechanism, accessible to all levels of the organization, by which hazards are identified, analyzed for potential impact on the operating system, tracked, evaluated, and resolved.
As required by the Rule, the majority of RFGS directly reference the APTA Manual text and matrix from Checklist Number 7 in their
SSPPs. Checklist Number 7 recommends that "each transit system must ensure that its safety methodologies are tailored to the unique capabilities of its organization." The Checklist also suggests that "a properly functioning System Safety Program must explain how the Hazard Resolution Process of the respective transit system is carried out and documented." Further, the (Continued on page
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