Audit Findings Analysis

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  • The notification and reporting of accident and unacceptable hazardous conditions
  • The preparation, review, and approval of final accident reports
  • The preparation, review, approval, and tracking of corrective actions.
Few oversight agencies have developed clear standards to guide the performance of hazard assessment to identify and document unacceptable hazardous conditions (see related article).

Other findings include (1) oversight agencies are not reviewing rail agency System Safety Program Plans in a thorough and timely manner, (2) oversight agencies are not sufficiently requiring and monitoring the conduct of internal safety audit process, as specified in APTA Checklist Number 9, at the affected rail agencies, (3) insufficient resources are supplied to support rail transit oversight, and (4) oversight agencies have failed to standardized key review and approval processes through the use of a checklist or some other means

of tracking activity.

In response to audit findings, FTA issued its first State Safety Oversight Technical Advisory on the accident investigation and submitted an "Annual Audit Report Template" to all oversight agencies to direct the preparation of this report to FTA. An additional Technical Advisory will be produced this winter.  "Best practices," including forms, reports, procedures, and on-site activities, are being collected and assessed, and will be posted to the Volpe Center's Bulletin Board in early 2000 (see related article).

Audited States have worked closely with FTA to resolve identified deficiencies and areas of concern. This partnership has resulted in the timely resolution of all identified deficiencies.  Further, as a result of the audits, three States have committed full-time personnel to their State Safety Oversight Programs.  Finally, audited States have initiated new programs to identify, track, and verify resolution of approved corrective actions.

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